Article

Regulation Growth and Bureaucratic Politics in the United States

Jongkon Lee 1
Author Information & Copyright
1Jongkon Lee is an assistant professor in Department of Political Science and International Relations at Ewha Womans University Seoul, Korea. E-mail: jongkonlee@ewha.ac.kr.

© Copyright 2015 Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University. This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Received: May 18, 2015; Revised: Jun 22, 2015; Revised: Jul 29, 2015; Accepted: Jul 31, 2015

Published Online: Aug 31, 2015

Abstract

Diverse public administration and governance studies have argued that leviathan governments are no longer capable of efficient administration and that new governing structures should be substituted for traditional government regulations. Nevertheless, a large regulatory structure remains intact in the United States. This paper explores why traditional government regulation has persisted even in the era of new governance. Several regression tests indicate that bureaucratic attempts to secure the survival of agencies rather than administrative effectiveness determine the extent of regulation.

Keywords: regulation; organizational slack; bureaucratic politics; governance