Korean Journal of Policy Studies

Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University

Korean J. Policy Stud. 2012; 27(1):57-85

pISSN: 1225-5017, eISSN: 2765-2807

Article

The Influence of Contextual Factors on Collective Actions for Locating Facilities with Externalities: Applying the Institutional Collective Action Framework

Hyunsang Ha¹, Jongsun Park²

¹Hyunsang Ha is a research fellow in the Korea Research Institute for Local Administration. He received his PhD from the Askew School of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University. His research interests include institutions and policy in green economic development, energy, and the environment. E-mail: hsha@krila.re.kr.

²Jongsun Park (corresponding author) is a full-time lecturer at Keimyung University. He received his PhD from the Askew School of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University. His research interests include institutions and organizations, local governance, economic development policy, and local fiscal policy. E-mail: pjs7511@kmu.ac.kr.

^*Corresponding Author : E-mail: pjs7511@kmu.ac.kr

Â© Copyright 2012 Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University. This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Received: Jan 06, 2012; Revised: Feb 08, 2012; Revised: Mar 29, 2012; Accepted: Apr 04, 2012

Published Online: Apr 30, 2012

Abstract

This study applies the Institutional Collective Action Framework to two cases: proposals for the construction of Taekwondo Park and the location of a nuclear waste dump site in Booahn. While the proposed park caused excessive competition because its benefits were overestimated and its private goods were considered necessary, the proposed nuclear waste site resulted in excessive conflict because of uncertainty about its potential harms and because its public goods were considered unnecessary. The former case showed homogeneity of political power and cooperation based on trust, whereas the latter case showed heterogeneity of political power and conflict based on distrust. Both cases showed politicians’ active participation based on their reelection goals and a blocked network structure between central and local governments. Stakeholders in both cases showed strong internal ties with other stakeholders with similar potential political and economic benefits.

Keywords: externality; institutional collective action; competition; conflict