

ROK/US Security Relations: Past, Present and Future

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I. Introduction

1. Research Objective

Presently, we are in midst of a very important transitional period where ideological conflicts that existed in our world since the end of World War II have come to a conclusion and a new era of world order is being established. However, the present transitional period is moving very rapidly and there exists conflict between the old thinking and new thinking. Difficulty exists in preparing for a new era.

110 years have passed since Korea and U.S. established official relationship. During these period we experienced tragedy due to ignorance. However, we can generalize that our alliance was solid despite repeating periods of cooperation and difference. Korea was to maintain sovereignty and prosperity due to a strong alliance.

Our bilateral security relationship is being forced to react to changes in a new world order. In fact, part of our long standing security relationship is being changed through negotiations. Unfortunately, due to differences in culture, the U.S. is taking the issue with a more rational and reasonable approach while Koreans are taking the issue with a more emotional and moral approach. Within Korea there exists two conflicting views about the prospect of our bilateral security relations. Due to past relations one view supports the appreciative feeling Korea should have towards Americans while the other view supports a more emotional nationalistic feeling against Americans.

Based on the statement that "History repeats itself, or at least in similar fashion," the research objective of this thesis is to examine the outlook of a bilateral security relationship based on a general overview of the past. I will take

a value free approach by taking a pragmatic approach toward strength and national interests rather than taking a stand from one particular country's view.

2. Research Scope and Methods

This paper will establish an analysis model for ROK/US security relations based on past bilateral security relations and decisive factors. World order, changes in Northeast Asian situations, the level of the U.S. strength compared to the world, its willingness to intervene and the capability of Korea by periods will be examined. I will then attempt to forecast the future by implementing the established model and forecasting the outlook of our bilateral security relationship. Since the future of the Northeast Asian region will resemble the one in the late Chosun period, I will attempt to forecast the future in this region by examining differences and common points.

This thesis utilized various renowned books, thesis, publications from the government and research institutions, papers from various seminars, newspapers, magazines and statistical data to analyze, organize and study the research objectives.

II. Historical Perspective of the ROK/US Security Relationship

1. The First Encounter

An official diplomatic relationship between Korea and the U.S. was established in 1882 with the signing of the Chosun-U.S. commerce treaty. However, an actual contact between these two nations began long before 1882. In 1834, Edmond Roberts, the senior representative of the U.S. friendship delegation that was visiting various Asian nations, recommended to then Secretary of State, John Forsyth, that "one benefit of trading with the Japanese is that it will allow us to trade with Chosun in the future."¹⁾ Later in 1845, the Chairman of the House Naval Committee, congressman Zedoc Pratt offered a resolution to send a delegation to hold talks on establishing official diplomatic relations with both Chosun and Japan.²⁾ In 1852, a U.S. whaler made a brief stop over at Tongrae where the first contact between the U.S. and Chosun government officials were made. In 1855 and 1865, some U.S. merchants were lost at sea and found on the east coast of Korea where they were later sent to China.

Unlike the previous peaceful and friendly encounters, in 1865, the U.S. merchant vessel "Sherman" (General Sherman) arrived at the Daedong river to seek trade with Chosun. The ship was sunk by the Chosun government and 24 crew members were lost. Due to this incident, the U.S. government dispatched an expeditionary force from the U.S. Naval fleet in Asia, commanded by Admiral

John Rogers, to Chosun. The resulting combat caused 3 dead and 10 injured in an tragic event called Shinmiyangyo.³⁾

The Chosun-U.S. commerce treaty contains 14 clauses. The key provision of the treaty was that when either nation is unduly threatened by a third nation, the nation not threatened has the duty to mediate for the antion being threatened. Other special characteristics about the treaty were regulations about most favored nation status, employment of foreigners, establishment of consulate offices, and extraterritorial rights. The main purpose of this treaty for the U.S. was to provide security to shipwrecked sailors. In addition the intent was to futher improve friendly and commercial relations with Korea.⁴⁾ This treaty did not include clauses concerning military and security issues. The content of this treaty reveals the basic characteristics of early bilateral relations. In fact, from 1882 to 1905, the U.S. did not directly get involved in any political or military issues concerning China, Russia, Japan and Korea. Therefore, it is difficult to examine the direct bilateral security relationship during these periods. It seems that both sides interpreted the regulation of mediation for the Chosun-U.S. commerce treaty differently. Chosun expected the U.S. to take the mediator's role. They even requested the U.S. to get involved in Korea's conflict with surrounding nations, but, the U.S. did not interpret the regulation of mediation as a requirement for military security.

Since the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. started to get aggressively involved in military and political issues in Asia. On his visit to the Philippines in 1905, William H. Taft, the secretary of War, signed secret treaty with the Japanese prime minister Katusra, which recognized Japanese suzerainty over Korea, under the condition that Japan would not harbor any aggressive designs whatever against the Philippines.⁵⁾ As a result of this treaty, Korea went under the control of Japan, and the U.S. closed down its embassy. the ROK/US relationship then was limited to missionary activities.

2 The Period of Intervention, Differences Cooperation

As the U.S. intervened in World War II in the early 40's, they started reviewing their policy toward Korea. In Cairo, Yalta and Postdam, conferences which were held during the war, the U.S. and its allies reviewed the Korean issue and came to an agreement to allow independence for Korea at an appropriate time. Until the end of the war, military policy on Korea was not finalized. On 6 and 8 August 1945, the U.S. dropped atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Ngasaki, Japan respectively. On 8 August 1945, the USSR intervened in the war against Japan, and occupied Chungjin, China on 13 August 1945. As Japan announced its unconditional surrender on 14 August 1945, the U.S. changed its strategy toward Korea from advancement toward the peninsula to a military occupation and dis-

armament of Japanese troops in Korea. At this time, the U.S. special envoy to Moscow, Edwin W. Pauley, the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman and others recommended that the U.S. military should occupy the whole peninsula and the Industrial areas of Manchuria. However, President Truman believed that it was important to quickly end the war, so he did not accept the recommendation.⁶⁾ Instead, on 13 August he took the proposal of advancing the U.S. Army to the 38th parallel (include possession of the capital city) which represented the northern most U.S. could advance.⁷⁾ This U.S. intent was given to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. These nations accepted the U.S. intent and General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the Allied Forces in the Pacific, issued general order #1. Thus without clear international agreement, Korea was temporarily divided for the purpose of accepting the military surrender of the Japanese Forces in Korea.⁸⁾

On September 1945, the U.S. military arrived in Korea and established a military government until 1948 when the Republic of Korea established its own government. Until then, the U.S. military government was the only national command authority in South Korea. The U.S. military government played a major role in military issues.⁹⁾ Despite the establishment of the Korean government, President Rhee, Syngman signed a military pact with General John R. Hodge, the Commander of the US Forces in Korea that transferred the authority of the National Defense Forces (including the police, coast guard, and the guards) to the commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea. This pact states that it is in the national interest of both nations to maintain the national security of Korea, provide facilities, equipment, training and organization to the national defence forces until complete withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Korea.¹⁰⁾ By the end of 1948, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea was completed. On January 1950 both nations signed a mutual military support pact and simultaneously established a pact concerning the U.S. military advisory group in Korea.¹¹⁾

On 12 January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a speech which represented the majority opinion of Americans. In this speech he described the defense perimeter of the US as extending from Japan to the Ryukyus and then to the Philippines.¹²⁾ The exclusion of Korea and Formosa required them to be responsible for their own initial defense followed by a commitment of the United Nations.

The Korean War made the U.S. to drastically convert her security policy towards Korea. The U.S. engagement in the Korean War allowed two nations to maintain a strong military alliance ever since.

The Korean war resulted in 55,000 U.S. casualties (34,000 killed). The U.S. also spent \$18 billion. The war effort developed into a strong alliance where the U.S. will provide both military and economic support and signed the armistice and the ROK/US mutual security pact in 1953.¹³⁾ Since then U.S. troops have

been present in Korea. On July 1950, President Rhee and General Douglas MacArthur exchanged letters that authorized the UNC commander to have operational control of Korean forces.¹⁴⁾ In 1978, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command was established and operational control transferred to its commander.

The mutual defense treaty followed the "Monroe Doctrine" pact rather than NATO. It does not state that when one nation is invaded by a third nation the other must be militarily engaged, instead it states that it is only required to "consult with its constitutional process."¹⁵⁾ Despite this type of limitation, the pact provided a basis for the strong ROK/US security structure up to today.

Since then, the ROK/US security relationship has not been as smooth as the time when two fought side by side during the war. The bilateral relationship went through periods of cooperation and difference due to changes in the world order, national interests of neighbours, and the domestic situations of both Korea and the U.S. as well as their foreign policies.

In the 50's and 60's the U.S. provided massive assistance and support to its weak ally, Korea. As we entered the 70's, there occurred changes in the U.S. policy towards Korea, bringing conflicting views to the basic security relationship. The characteristic of the US-Korea alliance changed. In the 80's, both nations became interdependent on all the issues concerning their alliance.

The core of the ROK/US security relationship from the Korean view was a question of how reliable is the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea, while the view from the U.S. was how important is Korea to the U.S. and how capable are the Korean. The relationship went through periods of cooperation when both views were in accord. The best indicators to examine the level of the relationship are the size of both the USFK troops and the security assistance program.

3. The Size of the US Troop Commitment to Korea

On September 1945, the 72,000 strong U.S. 24th Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Hodge arrived in Korea to disarm the Japanese troops as well as bring order and security to Korea. Since then, significant changes in USFK strengths are as follows: First, the complete withdrawal of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) and USFK troops from 1948 to 1949. Second, participation of the 8th Army and 10th Corps in the Korean War, Third, massive reduction of U.S. troops after the war (from 1954 to 1957. US 2ID and 7ID remained). Fourth, the withdrawal of 7ID in 1971. Fifth, partial execution of president Carter's withdrawal plan between 1977 to 1978. In the 80's, the Reagan administration reinforced the size of USFK troops, but since then, there have not been any drastic changes.¹⁶⁾

The background for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in Korea in 1949

was due to a shortage of military personnel caused by massive reduction of U.S. forces upon conclusion of World War II. Furthermore, the U.S. did not consider Korea as strategically important, so the U.S. decided to withdraw its troops from Korea. Because the Soviets withdrew its 25th Army from North Korea at the end of 1948 and since the U.S. already had presented the Korean issue to the U.N. the U.S. had no justification or international support to station their forces in Korea.¹⁷⁾

The U.S. policy towards Korea during post withdrawal period was based on the idea that Korea had no strategic importance to the U.S. The U.S. also did not want to see the peninsula become communized. However, they decided to provide economic and military assistance to strengthen Korea.

After the Korean war broke out in June of 1950, the U.S. was only able to dispatch its first unit to Korea in July. the number of U.S. forces had been drastically increased to 360,000 including seven Army divisions. A Marine division participated during the peak time of the war. Since the signing of the armistice, the U.S. started its withdrawal in 1957 and reduced USFK troops to two divisions leaving 50,000-60,000 troops in Korea.

In 1963, the U.S. Department of Defense held discussions about the reduction of USFK troops. The conclusion was to maintain the status quo as compensation to Korea for sending its troops to Vietnam. After the Guam Doctrine was announced in 1969, President Nixon accepted the National Security Council (NSC) resolution to withdraw the 7ID which consisted of 20,000 troops. After the withdrawal, USFK troops were reduced to level of 40,000. Simultaneously, the US decided to provide financial support for the 5 year ROK military modernization program.¹⁸⁾ However, the Korean government had difficulty government had difficulty executing the program due to lack of support from the U.S. This was inevitable for the U.S. due to the domestic pressure to reduce the defense budget in accordance with worldwide its military reduction of its troops. Further, the U.S. also assessed that the Korean defense capability had improved. All these elements led to U.S. military pullout from Asia an inevitable fact.

In 1977, the Carter administration announced its plan to withdraw all ground forces from Korea within the next 4 to 5 years. According to its phase out plan, the first step (1978-1979) was to withdraw one brigade from the U.S. 2ID and other supporting units which would total 6,000 troops. The second step (1980) was to withdraw 9,000 logistics support personnel. The third step (1981-82) was to withdraw residual ground forces including the 2ID headquarters. After the complete withdrawal of ground forces its plan was to reinforce the U.S. Air Force in Korea as well as communication units.¹⁹⁾ Due to strong opposition from the congress and North Korea's continued military enhancement, only 3,600 of the planned 6,000 were withdrawn. Since then no further withdrawals were made (Reference: Table #1).

(Table 1) Trends on Strength of the US Forces in Korea

(unit: persons)

Year	strength	year	strength
1945	72,000	1968	67,000
1947	40,000	1969	61,000
1948	16,000	1970	54,000
1949	500	1971	43,000
1950	214,000	1972	41,000
1951	253,000	1973	42,000
1952	266,000	1974	38,000
1953	325,000	1975	42,000
1954	223,000	1976	39,000
1955	85,500	1977	42,000
1956	75,000	1978	42,000
1957	70,000	1979	39,000
1958	52,000	1980	39,000
1959	50,000	1981	38,000
1960	56,000	1982	39,000
1961	58,000	1983	39,000
1962	57,000	1984	41,000
1963	57,000	1985	42,000
1964	63,000	1986	43,000
1965	62,000	1987	45,000
1966	52,000	1988	46,000
1967	56,000	1989	44,000

Source: Oh, Kwan Chi and others "An outlook and overview of ROK/US military cooperation" (Seoul-Sekyungsa 1990) p. 56.

During the Reagan administration the strength of USFK troops were enhanced and stabilized, but presently, due to the Nun-Warner ACT, the troop strength level is once again decreasing.

4. Size of Security Assistance

Since 1950, the size and form of the U.S. security assistance for Korea relied not only upon the U.S. foreign policy, but on the political, military, and economic relations of both the U.S. and Korea as well as regional circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula. The critical factors influencing the U.S. security assistance for Korean and ROK/US security relations are as follows: The Korean war, the Vietnam war, Dispatchment of Korean troops to Vietnam, Reduction of the U.S. troops in Korea, related environmental changes, and the Nixon Doctrine. Changes in the U.S. foreign policy, the perception of the strategic importance of Korea to the U.S., and economic development of Korea are critical

elements effecting security assistance. Even the type of the assistance has changed. From the 50s to early 70s the major types of assistance were grant-type aid such as the Military Assistance Program (MAP); the Military Assistances Support Fund (MASF), and international Military Education and Training (IMET). In the Post 70s the major type of assistance were FMS, Financial Support (loan) FMS Cash sales, and Commercial sales. After the 70s the U.S. provided technologies to Korea to improve its defense industry in addition to all the assistance programs mentioned above.²⁰⁾

The amount of security assistance to Korea received from the U.S. between 1950 to 1988 were MAP \$5.47 bil; IMET \$170 mil, and 36,416 people, FMS and Commercial OP1 sales of \$6.47 bil. Detailed lists are shown in <Table 2>.

The U.S. military support began in 1949 in accordance with the ROK/US mutual defense assistance act. During the Korean war both the U.S. and Korea combined its logistics structures, allowing Korean and other UN forces to use equipment and facilities provided by the U.S. defense budget. Although Korean defense capality increased rapidly during this period, it was still very small

<Table 2> Summary of the US Security Assistance Program to Korea (1950-1988)

Program	Period (US Fiscal year)	Amount	Remarks
overall MAP	1950-1984	5,471,719	
MASF	1966-1973	1,786,774	32.7% of total MAP
	1978-1984	(?)	
	(?)		
MAP surplus defense material	1591- ?	663,885	EDA included in MASF
IMET	1952-1988	170, 538 (36,416)	IMET included in MASF Basis of transfer
FMS Fund support	1971-1986	2,348,573	46.5% of total
FMS			
direct loan		454,390	
guaranteed (loan)		1,894,183	
FMS sales	195--1988	5,046,241	
FMS construction sales	1980		
Commercial sales	1971-1988	1,434,547	Basis of transfer
Stockpiling of defense assests for fireign nations	1970-1988	?	US asset as WRSA
Technology support of defense industry	1971-1986	881 cases TOP	128 case activated

〈Table 3〉 The Proportion of US Military Assistance to the Total Korean Defense Budget (1955-1981)

years	Total ROK Military Budget		
	Korean Defense Budget		Direct US military assistance
	Domestic support	US assistance	
1955-1960	23.4	17.9	58.7
1961	1.0	31.7	67.3
1962	14.3	39.2	46.5
1963	9.0	24.4	66.6
1964	16.4	24.7	58.9
1965	17.9	31.5	50.6
1966	17.3	30.7	52.0
1967	23.0	28.4	48.6
1968	31.0	16.2	52.8
1969	53.5	14.2	32.3
1970	56.8	12.7	30.5
1971	50.3	4.6	34.1
1972	65.2	2.8	32.0
1973	72.4	1.1	26.5
1974	87.7		12.3
1975	91.4		8.6
1976	85.8		4.1
1977	99.9		0.3
1978	100.0		
1979	100.0		
1980	100.0		
1981	100.0		

compared to the \$25-26 mil provided by the U.S.²¹⁾ As shown on 〈Table 3〉 the rate of U.S. military assistance to the Korean defense budget decreased dramatically. Until 1968, the U.S. military assistance provided more than 50% of the Korean defense budget. Since then it decreased incrementally until 1975 when it was below 10%. When grant-type aid was concluded in 1977, the Korea government self-sufficiently provided its own defense budget.

It is assessed the FMS loans played a major role in enhancing ROK military combat capability. As shown on 〈Table 4〉 FMS loans from 1971 to 1986 amounted to \$2.8 billion which was 6.34% of the ROK defense budget and 20% of the total amount invested on combat enhancement. Due to continued FMS loans, the repayment amount accumulated to the level that after the 80s the Roll-Over Ratio exceeded 1. Korea was not able to pay the principal and interest of the new loans, thus decreasing the proportion in the Defense budget.²²⁾

In accordance with the ROK government policy of fostering the defense industry, which began in early 70s. The U.S. began providing defense technology to

〈Table 4〉 Proportion of Loans on the Korean Defense Budget and the US FMS to Korea.
(unit: \$, mil)

Year	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Direct loan	15	17	24.2	5.5	—	—	—	—	—
Guaranty loan	—	—	—	51.2	59	260	152.4	275	225
Loan/Defense Budget	4.15	3.91	5.28	7.71	6.52	18.06	7.85	10.42	7.21

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Total
Direct loan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	61.7
Guaranty loan	129	161.5	166	185	230	230	162.7	2,286.9
Loan/Defense Budget	3.36	4.14	3.98	4.46	5.52	5.46	3.35	6.34

〈Table 5〉 TDP Cases Based on Years

(unit: cases)

year	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
cases	1	18	12	125	90	25	64	70	142

year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	total
cases	143	86	57	22	17	7	2	—	881

Korea. This assistance was provided through TDP, the exchange of military technologies, and joint and licensed production. As shown on Table 5, there were 881 cases of TDP from 1971 to 1987. Of that, 128 were used for the production and development of ROK defense products which mainly consisted of ammunition, supplies, and weapons. During the period, TDP products comprised 41.7% (128) of the 307 ROK designated defense products.²³⁾ In addition, 500 MD ('76), F5E/F ('80), 155 self-propelled artillery ('84), and Korean tanks ('86) were either developed or jointly produced. This contributed to the further development of the ROK defense industry. Support and cooperation of the U.S. technologies in high precision equipment such as aircraft and tanks were also provided.

Strictly speaking transfer of weapons from the U.S. with contracts can not be seen as security assistance but rather as a buyer and seller relationship. On sales of certain weaponry systems where the U.S. had the background of independently developing and producing these high-tech weapons. The U.S. made decisions from the security assistance point of view. During FY 50-FY88, Korea was the 12th largest of 120 US FMS nations. During this period out of a total \$99.1 billion the U.S. FMS to Korea was \$6.4 billion. Korea was 6.5% of the total U.S. FMS program.

〈Table 6〉 1989 USFK Support Situation

(unit: US \$ mil)

Expense	Content	Indirect fee	Direct
Real estate	Land, Facilities	1,596	306
Personnel	KATUSA, KSC, Economic support	203	4.1
Maintenance	US military support fee, Combined budget		4.2
CDiP project	CDIP		40
Logistics	ASP, Fuel, Service... etc.	286	48.4
Usage of ROK	Training, Range	33	
Military facilities	Air control support	101	
Tax exemption	Tax, Travel fee, Postal and Discount on Public utilities changes	2,219	403
		total	2,622

Source: 'Defense White Paper' 1990

Between 1974 to 85 the U.S. financed 8.3% of Korea's defense loans. The U.S. was the main defense loan financier for Korea thus increasing the dependency of Korea to the U.S.

Since the 80's, due to the deterioration of the U.S economy, and the rise of the Korean economy, since the 80's, FMS loans, which was the major form of the U.S. security assistance to Korea, halted. Instead and exchange of military technologies and defense industry support, as well as cost sharing of defense costs, became a major issue. The result was a change from U.S. the security assistance to security cooperation between two nations. The Korean government expenditure of \$2.6 billion to support U.S. troops in Korea is reflected in Table 6.

III. The Outlook of ROK/US Security Relations

1. The Changes in Decisive Elements of ROK/US Security Relations

World order and the situation in Northeast Asia, the recent phenomena of Gorbachov's parastroika and Glasnost, revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the reunification of Germany, have ended the cold war which lasted since the end of World War II, and resulted in new era of detente calling for demilitarization and abolishment of ideologies. These events are not the result of the outcome of the

US-USSR summit nor close cooperation between these two nations. Instead, it was an inevitable result that after strong competition, the communist system could no longer hold on or solve the internal problems it faces.

The decline of the USSR and the outcome of the Gulf war indicates to us that the world order will be run by a unipolar system of the U.S. A realistic condition for the future would be that without the U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives, no major war can be won. Despite the fact that the U.S. is the only remaining superpower in the world, this situation is not expected to last long. The reason for this is due to the following: First, due to limited economic and industrial capabilities, the reduction in military force structure is inevitable. This is well proven by the fact that a detailed plan to reduce one-fourth of its defense force has already been proposed by the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. faces major internal problems with the decline of productivity, savings rates, investment in fixed structures, trade deficits, drugs and various social issues. Second, despite the fact that the Soviets face difficult internal problems, it still maintains its status as a superpower from a military perspective. Also, one can not easily neglect the strengths of China, Japan, Germany and other powerful nations.

The future world order will be run by a U.S. controlled unstable unipolar system for the moment, but will soon turn into a stabilized U.S. oriented multi-polar system. Unlike the peaceful mood between developed nations, the regional conflicts between small nations, ethnic conflicts, military threats from those seeking regional hegemony, and the expansion of lethal weapons are foreseeable. Unlike the trend for arms reduction in the world, military competition between regions will continue and the number of small scale-wars will increase.

The possibility for regional conflicts will be due to sensitive issues such as ethnic and border conflicts. In this case, the major method to deter conflicts will be to maintain a balance within the region, providing a reason for powerful nations to intervene militarily. If the region is vital for the U.S., the U.S. will intervene alone if no group of nations with a common interests will unite and engage in the conflict. One can foresee that in the fields of economics, the environment, resources, and technology, the interdependency of the world will increase. Thus in the future, security and self-reliance will be vital in deterring war.²⁴⁾

In contrast to the development in Europe, the international order in Northeast Asia is completely different from the new order in Europe. The shift to a market economy system in Eastern Europe; the reunification of Germany; an agreement to reduce conventional weapons followed by signing of START; disestablishment of COMECON, and the WARSAW PACT all signal the end of the cold war era. However, in Northeast Asia, the largest socialist nation, China, maintains a one party system of communism. Recently, in his speech to commemorate their 70th anniversary, Deng called for the rejuvenation of socialism in eastern Europe proving that China has yet to give up on their ideological conflict with the West.

North Korea has yet to change their basic system by emphasizing the superiority of socialism under the phrase of "Let's do it our own way." The difference between the eastern Europe and Northeast Asia is due to the fact that Eastern Europe had experienced democracy prior to World War II, but had to forgo democracy due to pressure from the soviets to exert Communism. Northeast Asian nations have never experienced democracy before. the people supported the communist take over in China by ousting the corrupted Kuomintang government. Communism is the legitimate government in China.

Northeast Asia is still in a transitional period of moving towards a peaceful structure from the end of a competitive cold war era. The special characteristic about this type of transition in Northeast Asia is that it contains composite and dual structures from the residual cold war structure and peaceful structure. Based on these changing circumstances, the trend is that each nation attempt to secure its own national interests from the political and economic point of view rather than from a military perspective as in the past. Off-idealism eventually transfers to nationalism resembling the balance of power system of the region during the late Chosun dynasty.

Interesting questions for decisive factors influencing the situational changes in northeast Asia are first, how long would a federal system last in Soviet Union? How long will it take the Soviets to recover economically? Second, does China have the intent to absorb Taiwan after absorbing Hong Kong and Macao? Can one state with two systems exist? Third, how far are the Japanese going to expand their military strength? Will they acquire nuclear weapons? Fourth, is reunification in Korea possible? Fifth, will the U.S. continue to be a superpower? How are they going to intervene in Northeast Asia in the future? All these are difficult to accurately predict, but we will attempt to answer these questions based on past trends.

The soviet Union faces the issues of economics, ethnic diversity, democracy and independence movements by its republics, while moving towards parastroika and glasnost. The federal system will transfer to a confederation system which guarantees the sovereignty of its republics. The Soviet government will restrain the role of military intervention, and concentrate on rebuilding of the economy.

With the increased economic and political role of the U.S.S.R. in the Asia-pacific region, it will attempt to link Siberian development with the economy of the Pacific, by the reducing of military tension in the region, but concentrate on expanding economic cooperation. The recent Pan-Asia forum proposal (1990. 0) by the Soviets brings attention to the region. The Soviets will take an aggressive approach in establishing a multi-security cooperation organization modeled after the CSCE of Europe in Asia reasoning that CSEC in Europe was the basis for security and cooperation in Europe. The amicable relations between the Soviets and the Chinese which began after the USSR-China summit

will be further enhanced.

Through out the 90s the friendly relationship between these two nations will be visible. By establishing a relationship with the ROK, the Soviets will shed its NK supportive policy for a more pragmatic approach of enhancing ties with the ROK as a major economic cooperative nation. It is projected that the Soviets will take the initiative of developing the ROK-NK relationship which will eventually contribute to end of the cold war on the Korean peninsula.

Politically, China will attempt economic reform while maintaining its existing socialism. It is questionable whether economic development can coexist with a tight socialist system and ineffective bureaucracy. Regardless of their intent, gradual political reform in accordance with the pace of the economic reform is expected.

In foreign relations, China will seek a balanced policy with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in order to accomplish its national goal of four modernizations. It will also attempt to secure peaceful surroundings. In its relationship with Japan, China will increase economic cooperation in accordance with their program of economic reform. It will check the Japanese from reinforcing their military and political power. Concerning Taiwan, China will use a gradual absorption method based on one state with two systems. This attempt will easily succeed based on the fact that over 70% of Taiwanese population is native Taiwanese. On Korea issue, China is already executing a "two Korea policy." China will move towards separating Chinese reunification principles with Korea issue. The recent rapid development surrounding the Korean peninsula will enlarge the Chinese influence in Korea enhancing ROK-PRC relations.

The Japanese defense capability and military role will consistently increase under a U.S.-Japan security system. Due to the changes in the characteristics of a politics oriented international system and the interdependency of the Japan-US relations it is believed that Japan will gradually increase their military role. However, Japan will not attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. If Japan attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, the U.S., China, and the U.S.S.R. will prevent this from happening.

The U.S.S.R.-Japan relationship is in a stalemate over the issue of the northern islands. The Soviets believe that Japanese participation is essential to induce Asia-pacific nations to participate in Siberian development. The Soviets have shown their flexibility in this issue and willingness to enhance bilateral relations. Therefore, bilateral relations will be enhanced in the future.

There are no obstacles for further improvement in Japan-PRC relations as long as China solves its internal problems and seek modernization programs and economic development. Japan and China will reinforce their relations in the field of politics and economics.

Japan will enhance already existing friendly relations with the ROK in the 90s.

The Japanese will take advantage of the ROK government's nordpolitik policy and peaceful initiative policy toward NK to improve NK-Japan relations and increase their influence on Korean issues.²⁵⁾

In conclusion the situation in northeast Asia in the long run will flow in accordance with the new detente. The three powers surrounding the Korean peninsula will restrain military competition and cooperate by emphasizing economic development. These trend will contribute to peace on the peninsula. Surrounding nations will maintain a two Korea policy for the moment and be more interested in the status quo.

2. Forecasting the Changes of ROK/US Security Relations

As a result of analyzing the ROK/US security relations we came up with a model that showed following factors which improved bilateral relations: the US-USSR tension, reduction in tension between U.S.-China, increased US strength compar to others and its will to intervene increased ROK capability, increased common values of ROK-US, an increase in exchanges between two ROK/US and level of tensions between the two Koreas.

The factors that will provide positive effects on the future of ROK/US security relations are as follows: First, further reduction in tension between China and the U.S. Second, the US will maintain the present level of strength compared to others for the time being. The U.S. interest and will to intervene will increase, if not be maintained at the present level. Third, the capability of Korea will further improve. Fourth, the continued democratization of Korea and liberalization of markets will increase the common values of the U.S. and Korea. The negative effects are reduced tension between the USSR and the USA and enhanced ROK/NK relations. This type of situational development will have negative effects on the ROK/US bilateral security relationship, but it will have positive effects on both nations alone.

There will be no major changes in basic ROK/US security relations but partial changes will be made based on changes in Korea and the U.S. such as increased ROK capability and deteriorated U.S. economy. First, the ROK/US mutual security pact will continue, but the U.S. involvement will be based on situations. The U.S. will aggressively intervene when one of the neighboring nations attempt to take control of the whole peninsula. In a lesser degree of conflict, the U.S. will restrain military involvement and provide indirect support with a political solution. Second, there will be increased ROK support for the U.S. forces in Korea in the form of cost sharing and burden sharing. third the U.S. will gradually change from a leading role to the supporting role. Lastly, unlike the past when the Korean issue was totally handled by the intent of the U.S. Korean opinion will gradually be reflected as the freedom of activities for Korea in-

creases.

How will ROK/US security relations change if there is reunification of the Korean peninsula? The war loving North Korea induced the U.S. to intervene in the Korean issue in 1950. Since then it provided a good reason for a close ROK-US alliance. When the peninsula is reunified the major threat (North Korea) will disappear and obviously the US-ROK alliance will be reviewed. From the U.S. perspective, a unified Korea will have very important strategic, economic and military value.

The Korean peninsula can play the role of a balancer in maintaining the balance of power in Northeast Asia. since the U.S. policy in this region is to seek stability by prohibiting the emergence of enemy forces, the strategic value of the Korean peninsula must be considered very high for the U.S. The GNP of Korea will be equivalent to China in the year 2000. The military strength will also rise to this level. An alliance with Korea would provide the U.S. a basis to influence the neighbors of the Korean peninsula.

In contrast, from the Korean point of view, Korea will consider the following for security policy: The current ROK/US alliance, establishment of an alliance with one of the powerful neighbors, and the establishment of a combined security structure. Establishing an alliance with one of the powerful neighbors would first induce tension with the other two neighbors. Second, by maintaining an alliance with a stronger nation, Korea would not only have to play a subordinate role, but in case of a break-up in an alliance there is the a possibility of losing sovereignty. Third, if Korea chooses to establish an alliance with one of the weaker neighbors, then the combined strength of the two nations will be weaker than strength of one nation, like the time in late Chosun period when Korea relied on China. Thus there is a danger of being controled by a stronger nation.

There are two methods of deciding the span of a combined security system. One method is to include all of the Asia-Pacific region. The second method would be to include only the Northeast Asian nations. The first method of including a wide region would cause many problems in that different regions have different opinions on certain issues thus threatening the function of group security. In economics, since all the nations are interdependent, the coordination within a large scale organization may be feasible. The U.S. proposal of making APEC; OECD or the Soviet proposal of Pan-Asian forum would develop into an economic cooperation group.

Establishing group security with four Northeastern Asian nations is worth consideration. It will have the effect of maintaining stability in the region when a promise is established that if one nation is attacked by the other then automatic countermeasures by the three other nations will be executed. The reason for stating this condition is that if an invader is a very strong nation then we can not forgo the possibility of other two nations negotiating.

The ROK/US alliance has an advantage in that it provides Korea a freedom of activities over its neighbors by taking an advantage of the U.S. strength. Unless Korea is guaranteed of automatic US intervention or a clear statement of automatic U.S. intervention is provided by the U.S. in case Korea is invaded by a hostile the alliance will have a limitations. To get a guarantee of automatic intervention, Korea must become power or man the frontline with U.S. ground forces, but all these are non-feasible solutions. The most ideal security policy for a unified Kora is to maintain simultaneously the ROK/US alliance and a combined security group formed by four Northeast Asian nations.

As analyzed so far, the ROK/US alliance will continue as it provides benefits to both sides even in post-reunification period. The minimum conditions for maintaining a ROK/US alliance are as follows: From the U.S. side are the USFK (scale is not an issue, but functions essential for war such as command headquarters, ground forces, tactical air force, intelligence collection and 'c assets are important) which is a symbol of the U.S. will to intervene, Wartime Researve Stockage (WRSA), and regularly held combined exercises. On the other and the ROK side must provide the appropriate level of defense cost sharing, and war-time host nation support.

Lastly, we will review the future of the ROK/US military relationship in which a change is expected. We will examine by concentrating on the U.S. military strategies, education of the USFK troops, and the operational control issue.

In order to discuss future U.S. military strategies, it is essential to review the previous content of the Detente of the 1970s. First is the remote U.S. deterrence concept raised by Abramowitz. He advocated that "there is a change in structure to maintain peace and stability in Korea, however, no change in competition between the two Koreas. Now we have reached a period where Korea must provide its own deterrence factor in the peninsula." With this in mind, he proposed that "in the first phase the U.S. must conduct reduction and withdrawal of USFK troops. In the second phase, the U.S. must transform the USFK troops withdrawn to either Guam and Hawaii to a mobile force thus providing remote deterrence capability."²⁶⁾

Secondly, one should discuss the strong point theory by former Secretary of State Schlesinger. He called for effective countermeasures for a one and a half war which is to foster the nuclear attack capability against the USSR neuclear capability. In addition, maintain strong points for selective intervention for conventional combat. The strong points which he chose are as follows: 1) NATO with the West Germany as the center, 2) Korea, 3) Diego Garicia with emphasis in the Indian ocean. The following are reasons for his selection of Korea as a strong point. First, due to geographical reasons it is an area where four powers have great interest and Korea can play the role of maintaining the balance of power in

Northeast Asia. Second, the U.S. must prevent the movement of Soviet troops in northeast Asia to Europe. Third, prevent Japan from developing nuclear weapons by giving them an impression of the U.S. intent to defend Japan. Fourth, friendly support from both the ROK government and its people concerning USFK troops.²⁷⁾

There are two military strategy concepts that were discussed during the previous Detente. It is perceived that these two concepts will both directly and indirectly effect the future planning of U.S. military strategies, especially the remote deterrence, mobile forces, selective intervention and strong point concepts. In the new Detente period it is believed that the U.S. will take a remote deterrence posture by allowing the balance of power in each region and play the role of referee. The core of balance of power in each region is as follows: Germany in Europe: Korea in Northeast Asia: Singapore and Philippines in Southeast Asia: Saudi Arabia and Israel in Middle East, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean: and Panama in Central America (according to the strong point concept). The U.S. must obtain a clear statement and promise from above mentioned nations to secure military based and Wartime Host Nation Support. The decision to intervene will be based on the U.S. benefits and situational developments (selective intervention concept). As a result there is no need for stationing many troops overseas. The U.S. will withdraw most of troops from overseas and secure strategic and tactical airlift and sealift capability which can guarantee quick deployment (mobile force concept).

These concepts were proven to have feasibility during the Gulf war, and further development is expected. These types of strategic concepts do not require many active duty military personnel in peace time, making room for a for 1/4-1/3 reduction in troops. A decrease in the defense budget will help out the economy. Countermeasures for low-intensity conflict against drugs and terrorism are probably the future direction of the U.S. national policy.

These types of strategic concepts are being implemented directly to Korea. The Nunn-warner act includes the plan to reduce of USFK troops in three phases. When phase 3 is concluded in the year 2000, it is perceived that 30,000 troops will be stationed to 10 bases including USFK HQ, 1 division of ground forces (-2) or 1 brigade, two to three tactical fighter wings, and strategic and tactical intelligence units. By the year 2000 the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command will be deactivated and OPCON will transferred to the ROK side which would have established a self-defense posture. One last point that needs attention is that the present reduction plan of USFK troop is a revival of the reduction plan set out by the Carter administration except for time requirements for the withdrawal and the size of the final ground forces left in Korea.

IV. Conclusion

As we look back, both Korea and the US first met in an unpleasant circumstances and established a relationship which broke up. But since then they have maintained close relations. During these periods, Korea was invaded by foreign forces 930 times and experienced a loss of sovereignty. It also experienced a civil war. The tragic fate of Korea was the main reason for a close ROK-US relationship.

The 110 year old ROK-US security relationship went through a rotation of cooperation and difference based on such variables as world order; The Northeast Asia situation; the strength of the U.S. compared to others, the level of the U.S. interest in Korea; the strategic value of Korea and its strength were all variables effecting the coordination and balance of bilateral relations. We are now in need of a new type of ROK/US security relationship in conjunction with the changing environment. From this perspective it is important for us to be reminded of a lesson that "The past is a guiding teacher for the future." I attempted to project future relations based on analyzing the past from the rational point of view.

The geographical location of Korea given its people a mission to survive and maintain independence among the neighboring powers. The ROK/US alliance and combined security group by four Northeast Asian nations are a solution for survival. There is doubt whether this solution will be accepted by the U.S. and surrounding powers. It can concluded that both the U.S. and Korea will maintain close relations regardless of the Northeast Asian order (even in post-reunification). The characteristics of bilateral relations will develop from partron-client to interdependent relations. This means an increased level of burden of responsibilities for Korea. If we see this from a different angle we can say that Korea is moving towards the direction of self-defense and widen their vision from North Korea to neighboring nations.

Unlike the past, it is perceived that the major changes in the ROK/US security relationship has been that Korea will now take the initiative. In order to do this Korea must improve its strength. As Tobin once warned "the enemy for the fall of a strong nation was always itself."²⁸⁾ One should be reminded the fearful enemy of Korea does not lie outside but lies within ourselves.

"Past is not just passing by. It is like beans being fermented for a better future. Let's realize that 'history repeats itself' and learn form the past for a better future.

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