# Three Selection Models of Civil Service

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## I. Introduction

Modern public personnel administration has developed as a reform movement, in reaction to the abuses of the patronage system. The progressive reform movement emerged from the corrupt "machine politics," and was largely based on the need for administrative expertise and professionalism. Even the merit system, however, is not neutral or value-free (Thompson, 1983; Kranz, 1976; Rosenbloom, 1973). Kranz (1974) aptly captures this point:

> "throughout American history, the concept of merit in public employment has had a rubbery texture, stretching or contracting to cover the pervailing ethos, but at no time either before or after adoption of the civil service reforms of the 1880's has actual merit (defined as the ability to perform a specific job) prevailed as the predominant or exclusive method of selecting the American bureaucracy" (p. 436).

Obviously the merit system has always had many other considerations to compete with. Its substance has shifted in response to a variety of political and social forces (Mosher, 1982; Nigro & Nigro, 1980). As such, public personnel administration is inescapably political in nature, and thus reflects the dominant political values of society.

Perhaps, the best example which reflects the political nature of public personnel administration is a selection pattern. Krislov and Rosenbloom (1981) make this point clear:

> "administrative selection is so vital a process that it truly and almost inevitably reflects national character,... And at times societies have deliberately constructed selection process for different objectives" (p. 34).

Kaufman (1956) argues, American public personnel policies have historically sought to maximize three values: executive leadership; politically neutral competence, and representativeness. However, the three competing values are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This is, one value does not disappear altogether at the

end of its peak time period; it simply becomes less dominant as a new value emerges and becomes dominant. the three values still coexist in some tension between each other, each claiming its credibility in selecting civil servants.

Accordingly, three selection models of civil service have manifested themselves best on the American scene: the patronage model, the merit model, and the representativeness model. These models are applicable to other countries as well, however, because the values pursued by each model are likely to exist and compete with each other in every society.

The three selection models emerged in different time periods, and from different circumstances and political considerations. Consequently, they exhibit different, frequently competing values; and apply different selection criteria. However, the selection models coexist, competing with each other for political support of the executive and the public.

In this paper, the three selection models are examined in terms of the values they pursue, and selection criteria they suggest to attain the values pursued. They are reviewed in the order of historical appearance, and in a general context.

## II. Patronage Model

The administration of government personnel systems on the basis of merit did not gain great currency until the late 1800s. Until then government employees had been selected largely based on the "fitness of character" or "partisan patronage" (Mosher, 1982).

"Fitness of character" was used as the criterion to select the talented people with loyalty to the new government. Talent was defined primarily in terms of a college education which was the privilege of the rich and well-born. Naturally, the advantage of the upper class with a good family background in the competition for government positions remained formidable. Aronson (1964) aptly observes this point:

> "The solidarity of the family maintained by in-group marriage organized the upper-class community along kinship lines. Filling office with neighbors not only ensured the protection of group interests but also provided employment for kinsmen. The social distance between those in power and the masses of people made it difficult for talented members of the lower classes to attrct attention" (pp. 1-2).

The result was a government dominated by the upper class with good family backgrounds and, hence, far from being representative of, and responsive to, the general public.

Responding to the widespread resentment toward the monopoly of public office by the upper class, the aristocratic "fitness of character" as the selection criterion was replaced with a more democratic, equalitarian "rotation in office"

principle. However, "rotation in office" was based exclusively on partisan loyalties, resulting in politifal corruption and administrative inefficiency (Stahl, 1976; Shafritz, Hyde, & Rosenbloom, 1986).

Since the late 1880s, therefore, patronage selection has waned considerably. However, it is still used in some government employees, especially senior administrators with great influence on government policymaking. Ironically, the rationale for its continuous use comes from the criticism raised against the merit system: "How can merit servants, not elected but protected from political dismissal, be held responsible to the public?" (Mosher 1982, p. 5). Patronage selection is believed to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the elected political executives who, in turn, are held responsible for the people through the electroral process. Patronage is "a political currency with which to purchase political loyalty and responses" (Sorauf, 1960, p. 28), and thus "an essential element in overhead democracy" (Meier, 1981, p. 562). In addition, patronage may be used to attract highly qualified persons to government.

As discussed so far, patronage selection is made on the basis of one's loyalty to the party in power or membership with certain groups such as family, schools, or more recently, the military. Among the patronage variables identified, blood-ties such as family and kinship have weakened substantially with the progress of industrialization. However, they continue to remain somewhat influential in those nations such as Korea, which have a long-lasting tradition of family-centered society and ascriptive selection patterns.

Partisan patronage is still noticeable in many countries. For example, in the United States where merit has generally triumphed over patronage since the late 1800s, many patronage enclaves continue to survive particularly at the state and local levels (Meier, 1975). partisan patronage is believed to be essential for bureaucratic responsiveness to the party in power and hence for the overhead democracy (Mosher, 1982; Rouke, 1984; Long, 1949).

Membership in prestigious schools is also of great significance to one's success in some nations such as Britain, Japan, France, India, and Korea. As well as having completed college education or above, senior civil servants of the above nations have frequently attended more prestigious universities. For example, more than two-thirds of the British senior civil service are graduates of Oxford or Cambridge (Halsey & Crewe 1969). Over three-fourths of the entrants to E'cole Nationale d'Administration were educated at the university level in Paris (Suleiman, 1974).

The significance of education in the right college seems most important in Japan. Seven out of every ten Japanese senior civil servants graduated from Tokyo University. Moreover, Tokyo University graduates represent 86 percent of Bureau Chiefs and 95 percent of administratve vice-ministers (Kubota, 1969). A study of promotion patterns of administrative vice-ministers (Kubota, 1969). a

study of promotion patterns of Japanese senior civil service shows that, with legal education and success in the Japanese Senior Civil Service Examination controlled for, graduation from Tokyo University alone speeds up promotion from the subsection chief level to the section chief level by 2.2 years (Koh & Kim, 1982).

Though university background seems less important than in Japan and Britain, it is also an important factor in one's career success in Korea. In Korea, attendance at the same school becomes a life-long relationship among its graduates even after graduation, forming a school clique. Given this, it is not difficult to understand the significance of graduation of Seoul National University, the most prestigious university in Korea, to one's success in the Korean bureaucracy. Indeed, Seoul National University graduates have increasingly dominated the Korean bureaucracy since the Liberation in 1948. Nowadays, more than 40 percent of political executives in the executive branch are graduates of Seoul National University (Ahan, 1985). The increasing domination of political executives by Seoul National University graduates may indicate that preferential treatment has been given to them in promotion and transfer in the Korean government.

Today, military intervention is a marked phenomenon in a number of developing countries. Former military elites have begun to penetrate so deeply into the political area that they now comprise an important segment of the decisionmaking precess in a number of developing countries (Heady, 1984; Perlmutter, 1980). Consequently, in those nations, military background becomes more and more important to one's success in the government.

Military interventions accompany renovation of the government bureaucracy to match the outlook of the military superiors. Many remnants of the old routine-accustomed bureaucracy are cleared away from the upper layers, and many younger administrators with more positive outlooks are promoted to responsible positions. In many cases, such an arrangement is accompanied by a massive advancement of military-turned civilians into the senior civil service (Lee, 1968).

The massive influx of military officers in the government is frequently prompted by political consideration, rather than by a functional need to meet the scarcity of administrative talents in developing countries. The military-turned political leadrs tend to depend upon their former military subordinates for keeping their control over the civilian bureaucracy. The military is a hierarchical organization that emphasizes solidarity, action orientation, efficiency, and above all obedience to superiors (Gabriel, 1979; Weede, 1983). Needless to say, the authoritative executives with military backgrounds are more likely to prefer their former military aides to civilian subordinates, and bring them into the government despite their technical incompetence to do administrative jobs (Permutter, 1980). Wide use of military patronage as a selection criterion may result in the corruption and favoritism which accompany inefficient utilization of human resources.

## III. Merit Model

The merit system was proposed as "a corrective for the alleged evils of spoils-corruption and inefficiency" (Meier, 1981, p. 558). Proponents of the merit system assume that removal of political patronage from public personnel management automatically guarantees political neutrality and administrative efficiency (Sayre, 1948). Accordingly, the merit model seeks to maximize efficiency through laws and regulations aimed at eliminating political partronage from public personnel administration.

The merit system consists of the following principle elements: equality of opportunity, selection based on comparative merit (open-competitive examinations), protection from political dismissals, and political neutrality (Sayre, 1958). Nowadays, the merit system is more broadly defined and includes other aspects of the personnel system, such as promotion and pay based on one's performance or achievement on the job (Stahl, 1976).

Supporters of the merit system, however, simply overlook the highly political nature of public personnel management. The result is a "triumph of techniques over purposes" (Sayre, 1948). Among other results, unresponsiveness of career bureaucrats to their political executives is of critical importance, paradoxically providing the rationale for the continuous use of patronage as a selection criterion (Shafritz, 1975). With procedural rigidities and guaranteed tenure, the merit system becomes a great obstacle to elected political executives in securing control over the bureaucracy. Merit bureaucrats are more likely to be loyal to their own bureaucratic interests and the agency than to the initiatives of their politcal superiors. Despite the long-standing tensions between patronage and merit, civil service reforms have generally resolved in favor of merit. Today, most civil servants tend to be covered under the merit system (Meier, 1981; Stahl, 1976).

Among other characteristics, selection of the "best qualified" applicants through open-competitive examinations or performance on the job is the most distinctive hallmark of the merit system. The merit approach rejects most of the typical critera used for selection in the absence of demonstrate fitness, which include partisan politics, friendship, kinship, race, ethnicity, and religion. The only relevant criterion for merit selection is individual merit.

Merit is a concept difficult to define, however. The concept of merit is so ambiguous that in most cases it is defined only in general terms such as ability, skill, and knowledge.

In addition, merit is often difficult to measure. Most of the evaluation techniques and instruments developed are scientifically in accurate. Written examinations, the most widely used device of merit selection, are frequently criticized as lacking both criterion-related validity and content validity. Performance evalua-

tions have also been criticized with regard to their objectivity and reliability; superiors often do not know what their subordinates should do and do on the job. Despite continuing efforts to develop techniques needed to combat these deficiencies, performance appraisals still tend to reflect the supervisor's standards more than the individual's abilities (Shafritz, Hyde, & Rosenbloom, 1986; Thayer, 1978).

Perhaps the best approach in identifiying the "best qualified" candidates is to measure each candidate's performance on the job directly. However, output of most white-collar workers is intangible, making it difficult to develop objective measures to use in comparing the productivity of workers in a single occupation in a single office. It is even more difficult to develop measures to compare a series of occupations throughout government.

The use of producivity or performance as measures of merit raises another problem for researchers who have interests in earnings- and status-differential among employees; it is difficult to obtain information on productivity or performance. Thus, a human capital approach, employed in most earnings- and status-attainment studies, measures the qualities that the market indicates are closely associated with productivity (Lewis, 1984). The human capital approach argues that salaries and grades are primarily a reflection of worker productivity, and that worker productivity can be estimated reasonably by such factors as education, training, and experience (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1973).

Education has long been recognized to be highly correlated with salaries (Mincer, 1973; Blinder, 1973) and grades (Lewis, 1984), and hence with productive abilities. Education may aid in developing skills directly applicable on the job or inculcate motivation, work habits and patterns of personal interaction valuable in organization life (Becker, 1962). Some authors have suggested that education is more likely to develop general knowledge and intelligence than substantial skills of a particular occupation, and thus is best used as a proxy for productivity (Arrow, 1973). that is, the same traits that lead to academic success tend to make workers more productive on the job, although these traits are not associated directly with productivity. Virtually every study of earnings, in both the public and the private sector, finds that each additional year of education means a substantial increase in annual salary (Lewis, 1984; Grandjean, 1981). Given that salary in the government is determined largely by the grade occupied, these studies imply that education has a major impact on grade differentials in the government (Grandjean, 1981).

Another aspect of education is academic specialization. Academic specialization is likely to develop specific occupational skills directly applicable to a certain job or occupational group. There is considerably more variance in the types of degrees obtained than in levels of education of civil servants. Accordingly, in many countries, certain academic specialities tend to have advantages in selection and

promotion, indicating the government's perception of occupational skills needed (Peters, 1984). Indeed, Reed and Miller (1970) report that academic field of specialization has a major impact on salary, suggesting that not only educational level but major field of study should be considered.

Other human capital variables of significance regarding occupational skills are pre-entry experience and in-service training. Here, the two types of classification systems, rank-in-person systems and rank-in-position systems, show a marked difference. Rank-in-person systems are oriented toward bottom entry career ladder patterns, in which individuals normally progress from the lowest to highest ranks. Therefore, selection decisions are related to overall career potential and the capability to perform a wide range of responsibilities. Rank-in-position systems are essentially job-oriented, and thus based primarily on the classification and level of the position held by the employee. Here employment decisions are related to the set of work responsibilities ascribed to the position. Individuals, by virtue of having qualified for the position, are selected for the position. Shafritz and his associates (1986) nicely capture the differences of the two systems in selection decisions:

> "The rank-in-person system selects individuals on the basis of their long-range potential and aptitude to perform at various evels thorough the course of a career whereas the rank-in-position system selects individuals on the basis of their ability to perform a specific set of duties for one position or for positions in a certain job family" (p. 164).

In sum, in the rank-in-person system, relatively inexperienced high-potential young people enter the government to start a career at the entry level. In-service job taining is often included as part of placement and promotion in order to provide newly needed skills (Peters, 1984; Schafritz, Hyde, & Rosenbloom, 1986, p. 164). Governmental recognition of the in-service training is frequently reflected in promotion policies.

In contrast, the rank-in-position system selects the candidates who already meet the specific standards for a particular job. Acquisition of necessary skills is more likely to be a responsibility of the individual. Naturally, in the rank-in position system, pre-entry experience is important and in-service training tends to be emphasized less.

Despite the presumed differences in emphasis on in-service training, in-service training is found to be of significance even in the U.S. federal government, which represents the rank-in-position system. For example, Doeringer and Piore (1971) maintain that in a bureaucratic labor market such as civil service, the more relevant human capital variable is on-the-job training specific to a given cluster of related jobs, hence mobility tends to be confined within job clusters. In fact, Corazzini (1972) reports that salary is positively related to the number of on-the-

job training programs attended.

Work experience with an agency is the best way to develop many of the skills needed for doing a job in an agency. It is more important to employee development in rank-in-person systems than in rank-in-position systems. As discussed above, in the rank-in-person systems, relatively inexperienced young people are selected on the basis of their long-range potential. The employee's initial potential is converted to performance as he learns the detailed nature of the work, establishing productive working relationships with colleagues, and discovering how to achieve results within the bureaucratic structure. With his institutional memory, the employee knows what has been tried in the past, where outside dangers to the agency lie, and how to make the organization work (Becker, 1962). Institutional memory becomes increasingly significant as one moves up the hierarchy. For managers, organization-related knowledge and skills are of greater importance than job-related knowledge and skills (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982). A sound knowledge of an agency's routines, policies, personalities and organizational structure can be attained best through the course of one's career with the agency.

Recognition of these skills by governments is reflected in their emphasis on promotion from within as a selection method, and on seniority as a selection criterion. A strong connection between seniority and earnings or grades has been found in the public and private sector generally. The relationship is generally found to be curvilinear where the impact of additional experience tapers off later in one's career (Lewis, 1984).

## IV. Representativeness Model

Today, what was once a matter of the spoils system versus the merit system has given way to disputes about representativeness and equity. Government's concern with efficiency as a prime value has by passed two increasingly significant aspects of bureaucracy: its social composition as an indicator of political power and representation in a democracy, and its utility as a source of jobs and economic betterment for the citizenry (shafritz, Hyde, & Rosenbloom, 1986).

With its emphasis upon politically neutral competence and security of tenure, the merit system produced "the protected, appointive public service, thrice removed from direct democracy" (Mosher, 1982, p. 5). In addition, merit selection has been found to have a discriminatory effect against the disadvantaged groups in the society. Written employment examinations, the most distinctive hallmark of the merit selection, reflect primarily the values and preferences of the dominant groups in the society. Naturally the merit selection has caused underrepresentation of the disadvantaged groups in the civil service, particularly in the senior civil service (Kranz, 1976). Consequently, the merit selection has raised a question of critical importance concerning a democratic government: "How can a public

service so constituted be made to operate in a manner compatible with democracy?" (Mosher 1982, p. 5).

The concept of a representative bureaucracy was developed to integrate democratic values into bureaucratic government and to provide political representation of the general public. The rationale lies in the limitations of overhead bureaucracy in controlling the career bureaucrats, who really run the country. Even elections, which were designed primarily for registering policy preferences through popular control over elected officials, have become "predominantly means of legitimatizing political power" (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981, p. 16). In contrast, the bureaucracy that was developed as a means for executing policies becomes:

> "a major source of policy initiative. It has become a medium for registering the diverse wills that make up the people's will and as such it is a significant part of the representation process" (Reeves, 1972, p. 4).

Regarding "objective" responsibility as unrealistic and impracticable: the theorists of representative bureaucracy insist that administrative responsibility is basically "subjective" or "psychological" (Kingsley, 1944). Administrators are not simply neutral tools who mechanically carry out policies mde by the legislature. Rather, administrators are deeply involved in policymaking and policy implementation, with their own values and attitudes. The values and attitudes of administrators are critical to the success of the programs they administer (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). Thus, public administrators will be responsible only if they want to be, and whether and to what extent they will be responsible depends ultimately on their values, attitudes, beliefs, and interests. These values and attitudes are shaped by the social groups of which the administrator is a member (MOsher, 1982). It follows, therefore, that if the members of a bureaucracy are drawn predominantly from one particular group, they will be more responsive to that group than to other groups in society. To insure a responsible bureaucracy, administrators should be drawn from all important groups in the society so that the bureaucracy will be equally responsive to all (Kingsley, 1944; Long, 1952; Krislov, 1974).

Donald Kingsley (1944), who coined the term "representative bureaucracy," defines representative bureaucracy as one which mirrors "the dominant forces in society" (p. 283). Van Riper (1958) extended the concept of representative bureaucracy to include both social characteristics and values. He defines a representative bureaucracy as "a body of officials which is broadly representative of the society" (p. 552). To be representative, Van Riper concludes:

> "a bureaucracy must (1) consist of a reasonable cross-section of the body politic in terms of occupation, class, geography, and the like, and (2) must be in general tune with the ethos and attitudes of the society of which it is a part" (p. 552).

Harry Kranz (1976), one of the leading supporters of the representative bureaucracy, extended the concept further with proportional representation. He specifies a representative bureaucracy as one in which 1) the ratio of a particular group in the bureaucracy (or in an agency) equals that group's proportion in the national population (or in the agency's jurisdiction), and 2) all the groups are distributed at each grade and occupational category.

Theories of representative bureaucracy are based generally on the assumption that passive representation automatically guarantees the active representation: "individual civil servants will articulate the values and interests of their social background and thus influence the content and the implementation of policy" (Dresang, 1974, p. 1605). The existence of the assumed link between passive representation and active representation is difficult to demonstrate, however, and thus still remains problematic (Dresang, 1974; Meier, 1975; Meire & Nigro, 1976; Mosher, 1982).

Many factors are suggested as "intervening variables" influencing the relationship between social background and administrative behavior. The intervening variables include: the time-distance from the administrator's background, the nature and strength of pre-entry and post-entry socialization, the length and content of preparatory education (MOsher, 1982), lack of any enforcement mechanism (Downs, 1967), lack of formal authority for, and organizational sanctions on, active representation (Thompson, 1976).

Empirical studies have drawn different conclusions concerning the assumed relationships. Some studies report small or marginal relationships between pre-entry socialization by outside groups and post-entry behavior in office (Rosenbloom, 1973; Dresang, 1974; Meier & Nigro, 1976; Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1973). Thus, Meier 91975) insists that socialization is a life-long process where experiences in the bureaucracy may be as important as childhood socialization, and thus the assumption "that socioeconomic characteristics determine values for upwardly mobile, adult bureaucrats is in need of revision" (p. 529).

Several researchers have reported some positive relationships between pre-entry socialization by outside groups and post-entry behavior in office, and suggest the possibility of effects of social origins on administrative behavior (Lipset, 1952; Meier & England, 1984). After reviewing studies dealing with the linkage between passive and active representation, Thompson (1978) concludes that though somewhat inconsistent the studies "generally suggest a linkage between demographic and attitudinal representation" (p. 383) and that they "suggest that substantive representation does occur in various government's agencies in the United States" (p. 385).

These conflicting conclusions indicate that passive representation does not necessarily guarantee policy representation. The earlier assumption that passive representation automatically provides active representation seems unsupportable in the

absence of further empirical evidence.

The conflicting conclusions, however, do not mean that passive representation by itself is without importance. At the very least, a linkage between passive and active representation has been found in some cases, indicating the potential of representative bureaucracy for a more responsive government.

In addition, representative bureaucracy carries some other independent and symbolic values significant for a democratic society (Mosher, 1982). Among them, equality of opportunity seems most critical. Equality of opportunity seems most critical. Equality of opportunity symbolizes the open competition aspects of the merit principle, and satisfies the democratic principle of "government by the people" (Van Riper, 1958; Mosher, 1982).

Equality of opportunity also promotes "upward mobility" of the disadvantaged group members. In most societies, one's occupational status is the primary determinant of his or her social status. Given that public service has been consistently rated high in prestige and social status, especially among members of disadvantaged groups, there is no doubt that public employment promotes upward mobility of disadvantaged group members both within the organization and within the society (Van iper, 1958; Kranz, 1976; Mosher, 1982; Peters, 1984).

Denial of public employment, especially in positions of leadership, to the members of specific groups, not only has lowered the socioeconomic status of those groups in general (Rosenbloom, 1974), but has also had the negative effect of long-lasting deprivation on the socialization of the members of the deprived groups (Clark, 1965). Thus, Krislov (1967) emphasizes the importance of governmental personnel policy achieving greater equality in the society: "If the elimination of prejudice cannot be achieved in the public bureaucracy it is unlikely that it will be achived anywhere" (p. 5). Harry Kranz (1976) also stresses this point: "In terms of employment, the public sector is the preferred avenue of redress for minority economic grievances" (p/93).

Increased socioeconomic status of disadvantaged group members enhances their political power and participation in both political activities and other community affairs. Increased political power and participation not only reduce the psychological feeling of powerlessness associated with political exclusion on the part of the disadvantaged groups, but promotes, both symbolically and actually, the legitimacy of the government (Kranz, 1976; Mosher, 1982; Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981).

Given the symbolic and actual benefits of a representative bureaucracy for the society and especially for members of disadvantaged groups, no reason can be found to limit the concept of representative bureaucracy to those nations that have suffered from significant racial, ethnic conflicts. Indeed, after studying the linkage between demographic, attitudinal, and substantive representation, Thompson (1978) reported a positive, though somewhat inconsistent, relationship

among them and maintains that there is no reason to limit the concept to the United States. Rather, it can also be useful for most developing nations, regardless of their racial and ethnic composition, where the government has been criticized as being undemocratic and unresponsive, and thus legitimation has always been uneasy and diminishing (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981).

Theorists of representative bureaucracy view one's career as an outcome not only of the indvidual's atrributes but also of both organizational and historical context (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981). Hence, they insist that in addition to the merit and patronage variables, representativeness variables also have more or less effect on one's career in the civil service.

In theory, "any social characteristics can become the basis of differentiation for eligibility or success within bureaucracies" (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981, p. 59). In paractice, however, a considerable variety exists in what has been the basis of selection or discrimination. Among the variables identified, social class, ethnicity, and sex are most enduring. These variables are used not only in making initial appointments but also in making subsequent promotions, as presumptive proxies for a constellation of character traits deemed valuable to the organization (Caplow, 1954).

Social origin has been proposed as an important determinant of career success in a civil service (Kingsley, 1944; Aronson, 1964). Family background and social class influence early career orientation and motivation (Mosher, 1982; Peters, 1984). In addition, better family background often indicates a stronger sponsor and hence a better chance of career success in the government. A number of studies have shown overrepresentation of the upper and middle class and corresponding underrepresentation of the lower class in the government, particularly in the senior civil service, suggesting persistent discriminatory personnel practices based on social origin variables (Peters, 1984).

Most studies dealing with social origin varibles are based on a descriptive cross-tabulation analysis, however. These studies simply neglect the actual or presumed correlation of social origin variables with other variables such as education, that influence selection patterns more directly. Indeed, Grandjean (1981) finds no significant direct effect of social origin variables (relatives of a civil servant, farm origin, and parental occupation) on salary in the American federal government, with education, prior occupation, and other relevant variables controlled for. Within a given bureaucratic labor market such as a civil service, "salary corresponds closely to organizational rank, although allowance is also made for seniority" (Grandjean, 1981, p. 1059). Thus, this study may imply an insignificant direct effect of social origin variables on grade and hence promotion.

Sex has also been suggested as a primary indicator of discrimination in many countries (Peters, 1984). A great number of studies document salary and grade differentials between comparable male and female employees in the government

as well as in the private sector, with education, work experience, and other relevant variables controlled (Corazzini, 1972; Long, 1976, Smith, 1976; Eccles, 1976; Rodgers, 1977; Taylor, 1979; Grandjean, 1981; Borjas, 1983; Lewis, 1984).

some alternative explanations are suggested since some potentially important variables (e.g., differences in occupational distribution) have not been controlled in many of these studies. Lewis (1984), finds that sex is more likely than human capital variables to explain the occupational segregation. Thus, taken together, the studies clearly evidence a pattern of direct discriminatory treatment of women in the civil service. The studies also find that sexual discrimination is greater in the senior civil service than in the junior civil service, implying discriminatory promotion practices against women (Long, 1976; Taylor, 1979).

Another variable of interest concerning representativeness is regional origin. Regional origin generally emerges as an issue joined to other divisions. It is often interwined with ethnicity, social status lines, or religion (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981). However, even in societies that are homogeneous in ethnicity and religion, regional effects and geographic affinities have always been believed to have some influence on selection patterns of the government (Bark, 1967; Halsey & Crewe, 1969; Suleiman, 1974).

## V. Conclusion

This study shows that selection practices of government employees are political in nature; the selection moels have coexisted in competition, and the relative importance of selection variables has changed in response to the changing political forces in a sociealy.

The three selection models have manifested themselves best, perhaps, on the American scene. However, they also existed, and still do exist in Korea. The Korean senior civil service has enjoyed a high level of prestige in Korean society. As a consequence, there has been strong competition in Korea to enter the senior civil service, causing a long-lasting tradition of merit selection as examplified by the Senior Civil Service Examination.

Despite the long-lasting tradition of merit selection, patronage selection has always been predominant (Cho, 1980). Consequently, the Korean senior civil service has been experiencing a separation of the formally established principle (merit selection) from the actual dominating principle (patronage selection).

Representativeness selection has also existed in Korea. However, little attention has been paid to the representativeness selection because the Korean society is homogenous in terms of race, ethnicity, and language. In many other courtries, these factors define major categories of cultural differentiation and accentuate significant conflicts among social groups (Young, 1976; Subramanian, 1967).

Rapid industrialization and subsequent socioeconomic changes during the last

two decades, however, have greatly differentiated the Korean society. Today, the Korean society is no longer homogeneous; it suffers from conflicts of values and interests among competing social groups differing in socioeconomic status, occupation, provincial origin, and sex. Disadvantaged groups no longer seem to tolerate the social, economic, and political disparities they have experienced so long in comparison with advantaged groups (Kim, 1984).

Previous research regarding selection patterns of the Korean bureaucracy, however, has been done primarily from the merit perspective. Employment of patronage and representativeness considerations has been criticized mainly for its negative effect on administrative efficiency. The political nature of public employment and recent public demand for a more democratic government imply a need for more scholarly concern for the political implications of the patronage and representativeness models in studying selection patterns of the Korean government. A particular attention needs to be given to the effects of the selection variables on equality of opportunities for the government employment and promotion.

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