

## Articles

# Role of the State in Dealing With Fake News on Social Media

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The state's role in dealing with fake news on social media remains little understood. The objectives of this study are the following: 1) to identify the steps and process that the state can take in verifying and managing fake news on online social media, 2) to examine the means that different agencies have in developing and implementing policies to regulate fake news on online social media, and 3) To draw conclusions from this research and present them in the form of a guideline for improving the governmental policies on the regulation of fake news on social media. A mixed-methods approach was used. Qualitative data were collected from document analysis and interviews. Quantitative research was done through data collection in a questionnaire survey. Variables were determined to measure the factors affecting the implementation of an online fake news control policy. The quantitative research showed that different policies have different impacts on the following issues. (1) The organization with the highest mean clarity in determining the steps for verifying and managing fake news is the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society. (2) The highest mean support for the implementation of fake news verification and management is the Ministry of Interior. (3) The Ministry of the Interior had the highest mean data collection and convenient searching for information to verify fake news. (4) The Ministry of Digital Economy and Society has the highest mean in communication and coordination across agencies. (5) The department with the highest mean sufficient types, channels, and methods for communication and coordination with agencies in fake news verification is the Ministry of Transportation. (6) The position with the highest mean ability to shorten communication and coordination steps is the director. The researcher suggests the following. (1) All agencies should establish clear steps and process for fake news identification and designate personnel to verify it. This includes empowering agencies to conduct legal proceedings. Each agency only has coordinators who have separate job responsibilities, which increases their workload and reduces their power to take legal action. (2) Types of news should be clearly categorized. News that can be easily verified, such as official ministerial announcements, should be immediately responded to through normal channels. News that is new and has not had official confirmation by the ministry or has not been scientifically endorsed should receive expert study. A data center can be set up in each ministry to respond to the population online. (3) For verification of fake news on social media, the state authorized a five-year budget to the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society to manage the National Anti-Fake News Center. However, other agencies should also receive sufficient funding for this mission. (4) In addition to using the channels of the National Anti-Fake News Center, the government should cooperate with mainstream media to find fake news on a daily basis.

## Introduction

Over the past three or four years, fake news has spread rapidly throughout Thailand. Some fake news stories have involved topics of social sensitivity. In Thailand, websites such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Line, and others have been vectors of the spread of fake news, including the creation of fake websites or imitations of popular news websites to mimic news agency webpages. It cannot be denied that the spread of fake news has had an adverse impact on society.

In cyber-nationalism (Murray, 2011), the state plays a role in creating mechanisms to control the country's internet system. In Thailand, dissemination of false information is an offense under the Computer-related Crime Act B.E. 2560 (2017) if this information dissemination leads to destructive communication, e.g., scolding, defamation, irony, intimidation, threats, or harassment, classified as cyber bullying, which can disadvantage an individual, an organization, or a part of society. Preventive and protective measures against fake or distorted news are among the most significant issues for maintaining social security via

online channels of communication. In our age it is necessary to manage the continuous stream of information and learn to use new technologies. For the world today, fake news marks a crisis of faith among media organizations, other institutions, politicians, and the public in many countries. Fake news is a new phenomenon of false or distorted information that is spread on social media. It has a wide impact on the real world and is a major problem for democratic society at present. It is part of the broader security landscape of contemporary society.

This study addresses the following research questions. How does the government verify and manage fake news on social media? Do the means of the verification and management process of fake news on social media differ across agencies? How? How should the government formulate policies to regulate fake news on social media? The objectives of the study are the following: 1) to identify means of verifying and managing fake news on social media, 2) to determine the steps for implementing a policy to regulate fake news on social media, and 3) to draw conclusions from the research to develop guidelines for improving the government's policy on the regulation of fake news on social media.

### Theoretical Background

This researcher categorizes implementation theories into three major groups: (1) top-down theories of implementation, (2) bottom-up theories of implementation, and (3) hybrid theories of implementation.

#### (1) Top-down theories of implementation

The approach top-down theories focuses on policy makers' competence to clearly define objectives and monitor policy implementation. The hypotheses for these approaches are the following: (1) policy implementation begins with the decisions of the central government, (2) emphasis on the political process is based on system theories, (3) the policy makers are ignorant of policy impacts on policy-based services, (4) policies are inputs and policy implementations are outputs, and (5) the approach emphasizes the roles of leaders. Several studies have taken this approach (F. Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973), (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1983b), etc.

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, pp. 200–217) wrote an article entitled "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework" aimed at studying the policy implementation process and proposed a model called *A Model of the Policy Implementation Process*. According to this model, it was believed that the results of policy implementation rely on six major factors, e.g., the policy objectives, which expand the overall goal of the policies, to be understandable and serve as criteria for assessing success or failure of policy implementation; identification of resources required for policy implementation, e.g., personnel, materials, equipment and budget, inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, which must be accurate, quick and continuous. According to these theories, it is believed that policies with demands, high changes

and high consensus will be more effective in implementing than those that require small changes and low consensus. Strengths of these policies include: (1) the communication process links standards and policy objectives, inter-agency communication and promotional activities, the nature of policy implementing agencies and acceptance of the implementers, (2) problems relating to competence and the success of policy implementation involve the ability of implementing agencies, whether they can comply with the policies or not, and (3) operational conflicts because implementers do not accept what should be done.

#### (2) Bottom-up theories of implementation

Bottom-up theories stress the role of service providers as service providers and view policy implementation as part of a negotiation process is taking place in a network of policy implementers. These theories emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s. Their assumptions include the following: (1) official outcomes are not necessarily related to policy objectives, (2) cause-based links and outcomes that are based on the belief in top-down theories may not be correct and may not function in accordance with policy objectives, (3) the actual occurrences at the level of receiving service are of central importance as are the real reasons affecting the performance of low-level operations, (4) study should begin with the identification of networks of service providers, and (5) the concept that the policy starts from the top and is delivered to implementers who provide the most benefit must be rejected. However, the concept of low-level service discretion forms a more real problem than top-level judgment. Key scholars have researched this topic (Lipsky, 1980), (Elmore, 1980), (Hjern, 1982).

The Backward Mapping or Bottom-up Perspective Model for analyzing lower-level organizations and basic-level civil servants by Elmore (1980) suggests that the previous analysis of policy implementation focuses on high-level personnel according to authority and duty structures. In fact, there has been a demand for more attention to be given to those individuals responsible for producing actual results from policy implementation. Thus, the aim of this model is to propose an alternative approach for analyzing policy implementation that focuses on the opposite characteristics of the traditional top-down analysis model. The key component of the Backward Mapping or Bottom-up Perspective Model for analyzing lower-level organizations and basic-level civil servants is to determine the policy objectives based on those who are responsible for making decisions. The strength of this model lies in the importance of lower-level organizations and basic-level civil servants.

#### (3) Hybrid theories of implementation

Hybrid theories combine components of both sides to compensate for their weaknesses. For example, (1) top-down theory emphasizes starting from the top, with the objective of creating a general theory, following policy process, and emphasizing decision-making made at higher levels. This approach adheres to the representative or leadership model of democracy. (2) Bottom-up theory, however,

begins from the bottom and expands upward. In the given context, it seeks to describe and explain the behavior of the actors that provide the services. Implementation is not separate from policy formation, nor does it adhere to a fusionist model. It rejects the supposition that higher levels can only control lower levels entirely because the lower-level actors have their own discretion and benefits. Bottom-up theory adheres to participatory democracy. In other words, separate the leaders and local officials, the private sector and target groups must also be taken into consideration. Therefore, the hybrid theory brings together new approaches to integration. Several key works have been published in this field (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978), (Ripley & Franklin, 1982), and (Chandarasorn, 2009).

### Conceptual Framework

Drawing on theories and relevant research documents, the researcher identified variables to study the state's role in regulating fake news on social media and formulate the conceptual framework for the study. The study of policy implementation entails the identification of the mechanisms used to achieve the given goals (J. L. Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). The study of policy implementation includes individual or group activities in bureaucratic or private systems to obtain specified policy objectives (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). The study of policy implementation relates to the organizational capacity to apply personnel and resources in any unit and enable policy objectives to be met. This involves studying the means of each agency for implementing policies to regulate fake news on online social media. The researcher identified and adopted the use of interesting variables consistent with the study of factors affecting the implementation of the online fake news control policy from previous models (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1983a), (Hambleton, 1983), (Alexander, 1982) (Edwards & Sharkansky, 1987) as a major guideline for drawing conclusions from research studies and presenting them as policies for regulating fake news on social media.

### Methodology

The study of the role of the state in dealing with fake news on social media adopted a mixed method of qualitative research drawing on documentary research conducted by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) and the Anti-fake News Center of Thailand. This study also included in-depth interviews with 10 experts selected from those in the following agencies: the Anti-Fake News Center Thailand, the MDES, the Thai Meteorological Department, the Cyber Crime Investigation Bureau, the Technology Crime Suppression Bureau, the coordinators of the Department of Health Service Support, the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation, and political officials from the MDES. The quantitative part of the study examined the means that each had for implementing policies to regulate fake news on online social media. The population used for the study was workers at state agencies divided into two groups. Sample 1 was 83 civil servants

working at the Anti-Fake News Center of different ministry or equivalent, with one questionnaire (Questionnaire 1) developed to collect information from this group. Sample 2 included 200 civil servants assigned to coordinate with the Anti-fake News Center of Thailand from 100 departments (two civil servants per department) with a history of providing information to the Anti-Fake News Center Thailand; these were administered Questionnaires 2 and 3. In all, 283 questionnaires were disseminated. The data were analyzed with one-way ANOVA of the mean.

## Empirical Results


### State regulation of fake news on social media

Previously, online information was regulated by the private sector, in particular, by the internet service provider. Since 2014, social media content has been regulated by the public sector, which directly monitors the content, using law enforcement and censorship measures against inappropriate content, in a pattern of state regulation. One of the agencies assigned to the management of digital technology and to the regulation of social media is the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society,

The role of the MDES is to regulate, screen, verify, or remove fake news or misinformation that could have a negative impact on the general public. An understanding of accurate news must be created to enable people to recognize what news is true or fake. MDES, therefore, adopted a mechanism to integrate cooperation from all relevant sectors and established a committee to coordinate and resolve the fake news problem. The committee is comprised of experts, academics, and representatives of mass media, and it is responsible for planning and regulating operations and disseminating information according to the procedures of verifying fake news and analyzing data on social media, along with news in the social world. The government allocated a budget providing an 8-year commitment for the MDES to set up the Anti-Fake News Center (AFNC). The objectives and indicators of the project were determined to be those of an independent and politically neutral center for data verification. The Anti-Fake News Center (AFNC) regulates data on social media. It is independent and politically neutral (The AFNC Working Group, Interview).

News verified by the AFNC was divided into four groups, namely, disaster, economy, health products, and domestic state policy or peace and order. Once AFNC is informed of the information to be verified through its channels, it coordinates with relevant agencies via the coordinator of each, a position set up to perform this task, e.g., the Fake News Verification Committee of the TMD or the AFNC for the MHESI, and so on.

After receiving the notification and verifying the relevant facts, the agency reports its results to the AFNC. However, the agency response can take no longer than two hours, according to the service legal agreement (SLA). After a determination has been made, consumers can check the news at the website [www.antifakenewscenter.com](http://www.antifakenewscenter.com), the site that registers false news, incorrect information, or content



**Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of the study**

that has been published without a factual basis to clarify the accurate facts of the matter.

“Information on online social media must be scientifically proven by government agencies” (The AFNC Working Group, Interview).

**Comparison of Agencies in the Online Fake News Detection Process**

A comparative study of the agency differences in the fake news verification and management process on the social media is based on the quantitative research method by selecting the two following samples:

1. Samples 1: 83 people from the anti-fake news working group of each ministry or equivalent used the first set of questionnaires to analyze differences of variables in the process and resources. The opinions of samples about the policy implementation were surveyed. The following indicators were determined: (1) determination of structures, steps and fake news detection management, (2) collection of data sources and quick data searching, (3) support of the implementation according to the fake news verification and management policy, and (4) resource readiness in terms of budget, technology and personnel in fake news detection.
2. Samples 2 consist of 209 coordinators appointed by each agency to coordinate with the AFNC. The second set of questionnaires was used to analyze differences in communication and implementers' attitude variables using the following indicators: (1) ability to communicate and coordinate between agencies, (2)


ability to communicate with the Anti-Fake News Center in accordance with its SLA criteria, (3) sufficient types, channels and methods for communication and coordination in identifying fake news, and (4) ability to reduce communication and coordination procedures. As for the implementers' attitudes, the following indicators were determined: (1) knowledge, capability and understanding of policies, (2) willingness in coordination, (3) being trained provided by the AFNC or agencies concerned, and (4) acceptance of policy goals and objectives.

Comparison between the results obtained by different agencies and the clarity of the determination of structures and steps for the online fake news verification process showed that different agencies had different processes for determining structures and steps for detecting fake news, with a significant difference at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected. The MDES had the highest mean ( $M = 5.00, SD = 0.000$ ).

A comparison of the different agencies' and data source collection and quick data search processes for detecting fake news on the social media did not show a statistically significant difference at 0.05 level among the agencies. Thus, the results accept the null hypothesis.

Based on the comparison between different agencies in terms of the support for the implementation of online fake news verification and management policy, a statistically significant difference was shown at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Thus, the results rejected the null hypothesis. The Ministry of Defense had the highest mean ( $M = 5.00, SD = 0.00$ ).

The comparison of resource readiness in terms of budget, technology and personnel for managing and detecting



**Figure 3. State steps and process of fake news verification and management**

Source: The researcher’s observations and interviews

**Table 1. Analysis of variance compared to the mean for agency clarity and the process for detecting fake news**

Management process	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	53.662	18	2.981	2.440	0.001*
Within groups	232.137	190	1.222		
Total	285.799	208			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

fake news on social media did not show a statistically significant difference at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

The research findings indicated the ability for communication and coordination among different agencies in quickly detecting fake news. The result showed a statistically significant difference at 0.05 level. Thus, the results rejected the null hypothesis. The MDES had the highest mean (4.14 (SD = 0.378)).

The research findings indicate the ability for communication and coordination among different agencies channels and methods within agencies. They were deemed sufficient for communication and coordination in detecting fake news. A comparison of the results for different agencies indicated a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected. The Ministry of Transportation had the highest mean (4.17 (SD = 0.707)).

**Table 2. Results of analysis of variance compared to the mean for agencies and the collection of data sources and quick data search for detecting fake news**

Management process	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	20.310	18	1.128	1.683	0.66
Within groups	42.919	64	.671		
Total	63.229	82			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 3. Analysis of variance compared to the means for each agency and the support of the implementation of the fake news verification and management policy**

Management process	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	19.987	18	1.110	2.200	.011*
Within groups	32.302	64	.505		
Total	52.289	82			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 4. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of readiness of resources for each agency**

Policy resources	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig
Between groups	16.682	18	.927	.993	.479
Within groups	59.703	64	.933		
Total	76.386	82			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < .05$

**Table 5. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of communication and coordination among agencies in quickly detecting fake news**

Communication and coordination	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	53.662	18	2.981	2.440	.001*
Within groups	232.137	190	1.222		
Total	285.799	208			

Note: \* Statistically significant at  $p < .05$

**Table 6. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of types, channels, and methods in different agencies was sufficient for communication and coordination in detecting fake news**

Communication and coordination	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig
Between groups	49.264	18	2.737	2.564	.001*
Within groups	202.841	190	1.068		
Total	252.105	208			

Note: \* Statistically significant at  $p < .05$

The findings of the research indicated the ability that those working as coordinators with different positions had to communicate with the Anti-Fake News Center in accordance with the AFNS’s SLA standard did not show a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level. Thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

Coordinators detecting fake news on social media were able to shorten the steps by directly contacting superiors of

agencies. There was a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level. Thus, the results rejected the null hypothesis. The Ministry of Transportation had the highest mean for the ability to shorten the steps for communication and coordination (4.22 (SD = 0.647)).

This findings showed that coordinators in different positions in the different agencies being willing to coordinate in detecting news did not show a statistically significant dif-

**Table 7. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of communication and coordination of agencies' different positions for the AFNC with its SLA standard.**

Communication and coordination	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	1.851	3	.617	.393	.758
Within groups	321.652	205	1.569		
Total	323.502	208			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 8. Analysis of variance compared to the mean for communication and coordination agencies with steps to increase speed by directly contacting the superiors of each agency**

Communication and coordination	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	35.776	18	1.988	1.721	0.039*
Within groups	219.420	190	1.155		
Total	255.196	208			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 9. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of people working compared to their positions willing to coordinate in verifying news informed by the AFNC**

Implementers	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	.169	3	.056	.092	.964
Within groups	125.812	205	.614		
Total	125.981	208			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 10. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of the relationship of positions to opinions on the acceptance of objectives for online fake news verification and management policy**

Implementers	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	.521	3	.174	.217	.885
Within groups	163.948	205	.800		
Total	164.469	208			

Note: \* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

ference at  $p < 0.05$  level. Thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

People in different positions have did not show a statistically significant difference at a  $p < 0.05$  level in opinions regarding the acceptance of targets and objectives of the online fake news verification and management policy. Thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

The differences in people working with the Anti Fake News Center in their confidence and readiness in terms of skills, ability, knowledge, and understanding in detecting fake news relative to their positions also did not show a statistically significant difference at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

People working compared with the Anti Fake News Center Compared did not statistically differ in terms of whether they were trained by the AFNC or their own agencies, thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

## Conclusion

Steps and process of verifying and managing fake news on online social media of the government is to screen false information on social media. Thus, the policy was developed to let the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) establish the Anti-Fake News Center Thailand (AFNC) on November 1, 2019, made up of committee members who are representatives of the Thai Broadcast Journalists Association, radio news reporters, the representatives of civil society, and academics. The committee members were categorized into four groups: disaster, economy, health products, hazardous substances and cosmetics, and distorted governmental policies. According to the findings of the study relating to the steps, process and social media fake news verification policy, they are in line with top-down theories of implementation, because (1) policy im-



**Table 11. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of the confidence of people working with the Anti Fake News Center in their positions are confident and ready in terms of skills, ability, knowledge, and understanding in detecting fake news**

Implementers	Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	.427	3	.142	.155	.927
Within groups	188.674	205	.920		
Total	189.100	208			

Note: \* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 12. Analysis of variance compared to the mean of people working with the AFNC compared between being trained in it the or at relevant agencies relative to their position**

Implementers	Sum of square	Df	Mean square	F	Sig
Between groups	2.712	3	.904	.471	.703
Within groups	393.843	205	1.921		
Total	396.555	208			

\* Statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

plementation begins with the government decision to solve fake news on social media, (2) the political process is emphasized, (3) such policy ignores impacts of policy implementers on policy-based services, (4) policies are inputs and policy implementation involves outputs, and (5) the study guidelines focus on the leaders' roles.

The AFNC adopts two methods for its data searching systems, namely, 1) allowing the public to send examples across different channels and 2) using social listening through artificial intelligence. A computer system detects viral news on social media. There are about 30 full-time staff working in three shifts around the clock to monitor whether the top ten pieces of information that are being disseminated are true or not.

After having been detected, fake news is screened and released with requests for cooperation from public agencies and state enterprises to send personnel to verify the given piece of news. Each ministry also has an appointed Anti-Fake News Working Group to work in parallel with the AFNC for verifying, monitoring, and managing news. The working groups determine whether it is true or fake and accomplish this within two hours to keep the responses fresh. Once the information is verified by the agencies, it is processed into graphic information and sent out via the AFNC's website, Line, Facebook, and Twitter. These channels can be accessed by people to check whether published news items are true, fake or distorted. People can also call the AFNC to verify the news. Law enforcement has its own role to play, and police officers and officials from the Technology Crime Suppression Division and the Investigation Department are required to follow up and charge offenders later.

This study shows the steps, processes, and policies of social media fake news verification policy, which are in line with top-down theories of implementation, as (1) the policy implementation begins with the government decision to address the issue of fake news on social media, (2) the po-

litical process is emphasized, (3) this policy ignores the impact of policy implementers on policy-based services, (4) policies are inputs and policy implementation involves outputs, and (5) this study focuses on the leaders' roles.

The findings of the quantitative research showed that the factors in the steps and processes for implementing policies have different impacts with regard to the following issues:

1. The organization that showed the highest means in terms of clarity in the process for determining the structure of the process for verifying and managing fake news was the MDES.
2. The organization that showed the highest means in supporting the implementation of fake news verification and management policy was the Ministry of Interior.
3. The organization that showed the highest means in data collection and convenient and quick searching for information to verify fake news was the Ministry of Interior.
4. The organization that showed the highest means in communication and coordination of coordinators at each agency is the MDES.
5. The organization that showed the highest mean in terms of the sufficient types, channels, and methods of each agency for communication and coordination in fake news verification was the Ministry of Transportation.
6. The position with the highest means in terms of ability to shorten the steps for communication and coordination was the director.

Thus, the MDES is a major organization that is responsible for implementing the policy of fake news verification in social media, and it coordinates with supporting organizations to verify the information observed on social media. This policy entails a project that has a budget allocated to



the MDES only, not for supporting agencies. The findings indicate differences in policy management processes with respect to clarity in the data verification process and support for policy implementation across various organizations, including in data collection and quick data search for fake news verification. This is because supporting organizations do not consider fake news detection to be their primary duty but only a task undertaken to assist in verifying data requests by the National AFNC Thailand. This has also led to differences across organizations in terms of communication and coordination processes.

### Recommendations

Some principles and guidelines for working together in the detection of fake news on social media have been formulated. Due to the principles of resource dependence, communication and coordination among agencies, the types, channels, and methods in play for each agency, were different, as were the ability to reduce communication and coordination steps. These obstacles necessarily result in delays in verifying information. Therefore, the researcher proposes the following recommendations: (1) Each agency join a common agreement to establish clear steps and process, and each agency should designate personnel responsible for verifying fake news in each agency. Doing so includes empowering agencies to carry out legal proceed-

ings, as each agency only has coordinators who already have their own main job responsibilities. This increases their workload and reduces their power to take legal action. (2) Types of news should be clearly categorized to enable the verification of fake news across different organizations. News that can be easily verified, such as official announcements from a ministry, should be responded to immediately, through normal channels. Another type involves news that has not yet been officially confirmed by the ministry responsible or has not been scientifically endorsed, so expert study is called for. A special unit in each ministry may be set up to serve as a data center for the response to social media and to society online more generally. (3) Due to the policy of verifying fake news on social media, the state has allocated a budgetary commitment for five years to the MDES as the main agency to manage the National AFNC Thailand. However, other supporting agencies do not have sufficient budget for this mission, so the state should allocate additional funding to each agency to increase the overall efficiency of the fake news verification process. (4) In addition to the channels of the National AFNC Thailand, the center should also cooperate with mainstream media for assistance in detecting and presenting fake news on a daily basis.

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