

The Influence of Increasing Soviet Military Power in the Far East on the Security of the Korean Peninsula

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The increasing Soviet military presence at a close distance poses a more practical and serious threat to the security of Korea than any other country in the region. The Soviet transfer to North Korea of such sophisticated weapons as surface-to-surface missiles, the flight of Soviet aircraft over the airspace of North Korea, and port calls by Soviet vessels are some manifestations of its intention to deploy forces in case of emergency. Particularly in the face of two important events in Korea in 1988—a peaceful transfer of government and the Seoul Olympic Games—the joint military maneuvers in the East Sea and the reiteration of the Soviet support of North Korea in case of emergency made recently clearly indicate it. This paper suggests that Korea's security policy be planned and implemented on the following premises: (1) strengthening of the self-defense posture; (2) further consolidation of ROK-US combined defense capabilities; (3) emphasis on the fixation of peace in the Northeast Asian region. This paper also directs attention to the need for the establishment of crisis management system and the continued pursuit of the inter Korean dialogue as a deterrent of armed hostility from the North.

1. Preface

Soviet Military power has been greatly and steadily strengthened for recent 20 years in Asia and the Pacific region. Since Khrushchev lost his power as General Secretary in October 1964 and the conflict with the People's Republic of China(PRC) became serious, the Soviet Union has vigorously strengthened and modernized its Far East military power, recently the major strong threat to the security of Asia and Pacific-basin countries.

One of the principal goals of the Soviet Union's military build-up in this area is focused upon expanding its influences over the nations of the region with the superior military power in an effort to overcome the U.S. dominant political, diplomatic and economic influences in this region.

The viewpoints and the recognition of Koreans facing this Soviet military expansion are much more realistic and serious because they are now confronting with the direct military threat from North Korea and the Soviet military build-up might be a great potential to increase the threat to the security of the country. It is maybe enough for other nations in the region to merely anticipate the wide-ranged influences of the Soviet on their nations.

Recent Soviet-North Korean military relations have rapidly grown and the the rapidly improved Soviet-North Korean military relations have been the most significant development in recent days

in Soviet policy in Asia. In this sense, Soviet Far East military build-up is evaluated as the realistic threat to the security of this region.

In close military relations, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with the newest weapons, and in return, Soviet aircraft are now allowed to overfly North Korean territorial air regularly and Soviet naval ships are also using North Korean harbors. In addition, the Soviet Union and North Korea have recently made frequent reciprocal visits by both military delegations in an effort to improve their cooperation. All these are the good examples of their close military relations.

Since 1986 when the unprecedented Soviet-North Korean joint exercise took place, the Soviet military build-up has been a more realistic and serious threat to the security of ROK. Under such flexible and changeable military situations, and also with two important national events of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics and presidential election before us, it is very meaningful to review the security policy that should be modified along with the changes of complicated situations, and to search how to solve problems with the successful control of crises in the most effective manner.

2. Strategic Situation

(a) U.S.-Soviet Military Strategies and Their Trends

When we consider the Longitudinal Studies on the changes of U.S.-Soviet strategies and their military build-ups, such changes were not motivated by their own internal momentum, but came up with external pressures as professor North pointed out in "Interaction and Inter-perception Model".

The Soviet Union has so far developed its military strategy from the time of Stalin to wage an all-out attack by overwhelming conventional weapons and power, to the new one of Khrushchev to strengthen nuclear power. In response to this change of the Soviets, the United States has accordingly changed its military strategy from a massive retaliation to a flexible reaction and a new strategy of a mutual guarantee destruction by second wave capability. As shown in the changing process of U.S.-Soviet military strategies, both countries have developed their strategies in the interactions through the continued process of mutual checks and balances. Whether it will proceed in the direction of descalation or escalation through negotiations, this trend, particularly, is assumed to be continued.

(b) Strategic Situation in North East Asia

In North East Asia, continent, peninsula and strait are complicatedly intercrossed in various geographies, and many countries are located together in this region under different historical backgrounds, different political systems and different economic development conditions. From the strategic viewpoints of oceanic geography, all the nations in Northeast Asia, except top northern part, are unable to advance out of the region without any interferences in wartime under the geographical conditions that the Eurasian continent forms the outline of the ocean and the continent is also surrounded by the chain consisting of small and large islands.

The strategic value of the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia is extremely high in the sense that the Peninsula is adjacent to three strong regional powers of the Soviet Union, PRC and Japan with geographical advantages which possibly pose potential dominance over both ingressing routes of the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. By this potential power, ROK is assumed to be the strategic center of Northeast Asia.

Thanks to the high strategic value, the Soviet Union has thought of, from the times of the Russian Empire, the Korean Peninsula as the most important pathway to advance to the Far East. Particularly nowadays, the Peninsula is regarded not only as the place of strategic importance to stretch out to the East China Sea, the Pacific and Indian Sea from the Maritime Province of Siberia and the East Sea, but also if the Soviet Union might have forward base in Korean Peninsula, it could block Japan and PRC by besetting from the East Sea and isolating Japan at the same time.

With the recognition of this strategic importance, the Soviet Union has done its best to increase the influences on the Korean Peninsula as one of the principal goals of Soviet policy in Asia.

(c) In Northeast Asia surrounding the Republic of Korea, four great powers such as the Soviets, PRC, Japan and U.S. have competed for their own benefit in this strategically important area of the world and their interests have been complicatedly entangled with each other in the interactions.

As sociometry theory says, the countries in this region have shown various kinds of attitudes and actions necessary for the security and benefit of their nations, such as familiarization/hostility, accession/deviation and agreement/opposition, etc. This variety of changes in actions and policy making direction of the nations is like a recursive cycle of stimulus and response shown in the process of taking actions and attitudes to cope with those of others by the manners of perceptions based upon its own value, interest and image system. These complicated interactions: increase uncertainty in Northeast Asia. The great powers have very different viewpoints particularly on Korean Peninsula and the difference of viewpoints plays a dominant role as a potential threat to the security of the Peninsula.

3. Soviet Policy in Asia

(a) Soviet's Expansion Policy in North East Asia

Since Lenin emphasized the important interest in Northeast Asia with the new recognition by saying "The Soviet Union belongs to Asia as well as Europe geographically, economically and historically", this region has been thought of as a strategically important area like Europe on account of Soviet security interest as below items, and it has always been reflected on Soviet policy in a specific way or apocalyptically.

First, the Soviet Union feels a very sensitive geographical vulnerability because over the half of its territory is concentrated on Siberia. The Siberian region is linked with the Soviets in Europe only by Siberian-crossing railroad supplemented by Baikal-Amur railroad, air route and circumvented sea lane via the Polar Sea. This geographical vulnerability results in an unstable line of communication which is the deep concerns of the Soviets.

Second, the People' Republic of China, the only nuclear-possessed nation in Asia, is recognized as the most direct threat to the security of the Soviet Union in this region. The cooperative relations with PRC in the 1950s turned into hostile relations and the conflicts of two nations were aggravating in late 60s, experiencing the most serious border confrontations in March 1969. For the Soviets with such bitter experience, PRC is estimated to be the potential power of direct threat to the security of the country.

Third, the United States has already deployed strong military forces with the capability of nuclear

attacks on Soviet mainland, in ROK, Japan, the Philippines and Guam, and furthermore, it has tried to build up three strong power system coordinating with PRC and Japan for the stability of the region, steadily tightening the pressures on the Soviets after the improvement of U.S.-PRC relations in early 70s.

Fourth, in the process of exhaustion of the natural resources in the west of the Ural Mountains, the Soviet Union has come to put much emphasis on the development of Siberia as the most pending goal of the nation and the matter of defense for this region has also emerged as the important task since 1970 with Siberian development. Under these circumstances of security interests, relatively low priority was traditionally put on Northeast Asia and the Pacific region in Soviet foreign policy. However, the regions have recently taken a high priority in its foreign policy. Despite the recognition of importance, however, the Soviet Union failed to have an inclusive strategy to link its policy in Northeast Asia with the general foreign policy of the nation. The initial attempt to gain influences in this region was the draft of "Asian Collective Security System" proposed by Breznev in June 1969. In this draft, the Soviet Union suggested that all the Asian nations can take part in this collective efforts to secure peace and stability in Asia, but the principal goal of the Soviets remained the socialization of mainly Southeast Asian countries including India, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Burma and Singapore, blocking the power expansion of PRC and in addition, another goal was to lay the solid groundwork in the Indo-china Peninsula.

But the Soviet Union had made no specific developments in this region, and ASEAN has reacted coolly to Soviet efforts to expand its influences in Southeast Asia largely due to its hidden intentions and continued Soviet support to Vietnam. Anyway, the Soviet Union does have some strategically important and realistic goals in this region, though they are not an integrated strategy.

First, Moscow has persisted in its efforts to weaken or, if possible, to eradicate the dominant political and military influences of U.S. on the nations in the region. In present viewpoint, the most important goal of the Soviet policy is to block U.S. threat by strategic weapons to the national security in the sense that U.S. is the only nation with the capability of direct challenge by strategic weapons.

Second, Soviet-Sino relations had shown little substantive progress since the renewal of normalization talks. In this situation, the Soviet Union might try to isolate PRC by tightening the pressure, or at least by intending to create a favorable relationship with PRC as in 1950's. The change for past 20 years from cooperative relations with PRC in 1950's to extremely hostile relations not only has brought about the vital influences on the balance of power in Asia, including the improvement of U.S.-PRC bilateral relations, but also has weakened the justification of the Soviets as the forte of world communist countries. The Soviet Union believes PRC might be a serious threat if it would be modernized and armed with new weapons.

Third, the Soviet Union also intends to block the rearmament of Japan, and on the other hand, it will also make every effort to prevent U.S. from building up three power system with PRC and Japan by weakening the U.S.-PRC relations. At the same time, the Soviet Union is seeking for a wide-range cooperative relations with Japan in politics and economy in an effort to introduce capitals and technology necessary for Siberian development. Finally, in the vortex of Soviet-Sino conflict, the Soviet Union hopes to remain the external power to take dominant influences on North Korea, and on the other hand, it is willing to procure potential domination over the whole Korean

Peninsula by increasing influences on the Republic of Korea. As in many other regions neighboring with the Soviets, the Soviet Union regards the Korean Peninsula not only as a cornerstone to advance into the Pacific, but as a forward base to stretch out when U.S., Japan and PRC try to constitute a besieging net against the Soviets. The Soviet Union is very sensitive in its security interest to the peninsula and will take on complicated aspects influenced by the relations with U.S., Japan and PRC. The Soviet Union will also try to take the initiative of the conflict when large scale military confrontation between South and North Korea might take place.

To accomplish these major goals, it has undertaken dual strategies of diplomatic offensive to improve the relations with Far East nations, and at the same time, of military demonstration by military strengthening in this region. Considering the efforts to improve diplomatic relations with PRC after the Breznev's proposal at Tashkent in February 1982, the Soviet Union had had 7 meetings with PRC at the level of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to improve bilateral relationship, besides the mutual economic exchanges including trade agreement between the two countries in February 1984. Despite the positive development of Soviet-Sino relations, there are, however, still some negative factors which present major obstacles to the improvement in bilateral relations.

First, the reduction of Soviet forces stationed at Mongol and Soviet-Sino border. Second, Soviet support of Vietnam in Cambodian conflict. Third, retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Besides these three obstacles, PRC has always criticized strongly that there is another subtle matter of reluctant viewpoint of the Soviets in looking at the cooperative relations of U.S. and PRC in technology and military necessary for promoting the modernization of PRC in agriculture, science and technology, industry and national defense. All these negative factors will draw a limitline of normalization between the two nations.

On the other hand, after the first meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan at the funeral of Chernenko in March 1985, Soviet-Japan relations had the new milestone to improve their relationships after the 10-year hiatus by the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Japan in January 1986.

But the proper measure is not made yet to solve the problem of the return of four islands in Northern Territories illegally occupied by the Soviet Union, the primary key to improved Soviet-Japanese relations. In addition, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and Japan's improvement of conventional self-defense capability have drawn stiff criticism from the Soviet Union while Japan worries about the threat by Soviet's strengthening its military power in the Far East. Under these circumstances, it seems to be difficult to settle down normal relations, despite the recent improvement of Soviet-Japan relations in non-political areas.

The Soviet Union is greatly depending upon military power as well as diplomatic offensive for overcoming the inferiority in political and economic influences in this region, hinting that it will strengthen its military power in quantity and quality.

(b) With Gorbachev's policy of emphasizing Asia and the Pacific region after he came to power, the Soviet Union has taken an unprecedentedly more open and flexible policy in the domestic political and social reform to accomplish economic reform as well as in the introduction of capitals and new advanced science, and technology necessary for economic development. He, officially suggesting the improvement of relations with PRC in his inaugural address, has also shown the new tendency to emphasize Asia and the Pacific region in Soviet policy, escaping from the traditional

foreign policy, so called Gromico style that his predecessors had pursued.

In May 1985, Gorbachev took active diplomatic offensive in his Asian policy by proposing the draft of "Asia-Pacific Collective Security System." But his tendency of emphasizing Asia and the Pacific region had not been eventually reflected on Soviet policy until his July 1986 Vladivostok speech to propose "the opening of Asia and Pacific Regional Security Conference."

In the Vladivostok address, Gorbachev

1) Proposed to hold Asia-Pacific Regional Security Conference and hoped to enter the Organization of Pacific Economic Cooperation.

2) Proposed to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons in Asia and the Pacific region, and also to reduce military forces from Soviet-PRC border.

3) Reviewed the reduction of Mongo-stationed Soviet forces and the promotion of the retreat of Afghanistan-stationed forces in part.

4) Promoted the recovery of mutual trust in Asia and the Pacific region, and proposed to discuss the prevention of military power utilization, and also propose the to make the countermeasure to prevent international terrorism, and to secure the safety of sea routes.

5) Intended to open its foreign policy to Asia and Pacific nations.

6) Hoped to cooperate with PRC in the efforts of modernization to improve friendly relations.

7) Promoted a long-term cooperation with Japan in economy and the use of peace in space.

8) Agreed to the solution of South-North Korean problem by easing tension on the Korean Peninsula, and also supported North Korea's proposal to open dialogue between South-North Korea and at the same time, criticizen the unfaithful attitude of U.S. in the matter of Asia-Pacific Security cooperation and arms reduction talks.

It is evident that the principal goals of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech were focused on leading the economic, scientific and technological cooperation with Japan, improving relations with ASEAN, and cooperating with South Pacific nations including Australia and Newzealand.

Vladivostok speech can be estimated that the Soviet Union has shown its strong will, its dominant role in regional security and its position as a Asia-Pacific nation to the world.

After Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev has unfolded active diplomacy by sending its special envoys composed of Deputy Premiere Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister to 16 nations including PRC, Japan, Australia and South East Asian nations to increase cooperation and mutual understanding with the nations. Even though the Vladivostok speech showed a more advanced attitude to improve relations with Asia-Pacific nations including PRC, the Soviet Union will meet the limit of its diplomatic offensive in Asia-Pacific region because distrust is still existing among the nations in this region.

On the other hand, Gorbachev has continued to build up its military power abreast with diplomatic offensive in peace. Regarding the military build-up after the coming to power of Gorvachev, the Soviet Union has increasingly deployed 162 Intermediate Range Missiles SS-20 from SS-20 in the past, and the Pacific Fleet has become the strongest among its 4 fleets. Deployment of latest aircraft has brought forth quality advance in the Soviet air power as well.

Even though Gorbachev shows a little flexibility in his foreign policy tone and emphasis, the proliferation of Soviet forces in the Far East demonstrates that the military power is still utilized as a means of flexing muscle in the Soviet foreign policies.

4. The Increase of Soviet Military Power In The Far East And Its Influence

(a) The Increase Trend In the Far East

The proliferation trend of Soviet military strength in the Far East is generally divided into the four following phases: The first phase stretches from 1945, the year marking the end of World War II, to 1954 when Stalin died. During this period, while drastically reducing the number of its forces, the Soviet Union developed and employed nuclear weapons, their transportation means, tight air defense networks and ocean-oriented naval might including submarine forces.

The second phase started in 1954 and ended in 1964, the year Khrushchev was ousted. This period saw dramatic changes in the Soviet military strategy and doctrines. As a result, more emphasis was placed on firepower and mobility than the number of troops, and naval programs were re-evaluated. This eventually suspended plans to intensify naval strength for four years until 1957. The year of 1961 saw resumption of naval power growth-even that in small size. During this period, missile systems were introduced in ground and submarine forces. Furthermore, three regular branches of the Armed Forces--the Army, the Navy and the Air Force were augmented to five branches with the foundations of the Territorial Defense Forces(1955) and the Strategic Rocket Forces (1959). Khrushchev, in this period, announced "limited deterrence military doctrines" and, in accordance with these doctrines, medium-range missiles, bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed and deployed, respectively targeting Europe and major cities of the United States. Meanwhile, there was a large-scale slash in the number of troops between 1955 and 1959.

The third phase stretched from 1965 to 1978 when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on SALT II. During this period, the Soviets strongly pushed ahead with military modernization programs and proliferation of troops in Northeast Asia as a result of worsening Sino-Soviet confrontations. The Sino-Soviet armed clashes along the borders in 1969 touched off the Soviet troop increase by 210,000 in the affected areas. For the next 10 years, the number of Divisions increased from 25 to 40. In addition, combat aircraft grew by 35% and the Soviet Pacific Fleet increased by about 100%. The number of modern ballistic missile-equipped submarines went up from 10 to 30.

The fourth period got under way from 1978 throughout today. This period saw the Soviet military power in the Far East concentrating on the improvement of deployment capabilities to the extent that it could present both a threat and leverage in all the countries in Asia and the Pacific region not to mention of China. Furthermore, originating from comprehensive modernization drive, the Soviet Union, in all branches of the Armed Forces, appeared as a military superpower in Asian and Pacific regions. A look at the operations system shows the foundings of the Far East Unified Command(1979), the Division Command(1980) and the Air Command(1981). The Unified Command united four regional Commands across Siberia and Soviet forces in Mongolia and was in control of exclusive operations in the Far East. In addition, Army & Air Force Unified Command(1986) was established in the southern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula. All these moves were intended to further military operations systems in the Far East.

As far as nuclear might is concerned, the Soviets have deployed 162 medium-range SS-20s, 460 ICBM, 265 submarine-launched SLBMS and 90 Backfire Bombers in the Far East. In particular,

one-third of all Soviet SS-20s have been placed in this region.

As for ground forces, the number of Divisions have exceeded 53 and some 15,000 tanks, 12,500 armored personnel carriers, and 5,000 artillery batteries have been placed. Additionally, the placements of automatic weapon systems and MI-24 helicopters have greatly improved mobility and firepower.

In the field of air power, some 2,000 tactical aircraft have been put in place. TU-95 A/B/C Bomber have been replaced by more sophisticated TU-95 G/M Bomber, which enhanced STAND-OFF attack capabilities. The deployment of the third generation aircraft such as SU-24 have bolstered anti-surface attack capabilities. As for anti-air interception capacity, such fourth generation aircraft as MIG-31, and SU-27 have offered all-direction, low profile supervision and attack capabilities.

As shown in the number of total vessels—835, the Soviet Pacific naval forces not only secured quantity growth with 2 Kiev-class aircraft carriers, 1 Kiev-class frigate, 120 submarines, 80 surface combat vessels and 150 amphibious vessels included in the brass, but they have also turned out to be the most powerful in the whole Soviet fleets due to persistent modernization efforts. They have actually transformed into oceanic attack forces.

After constructing military bases at Kham Rhan Bay in Vietnam, the Soviets have placed 25 to 30 vessels, 5 attack submarines, 16 TU-16 intermediate-range bombers, 14 MIG-23s and 8 TU-95 reconnaissance planes, which further enhanced Soviet power employment abilities in the Indian Ocean as well as the Asian and Pacific regions.

(b) Military Honeymoon Between The Soviet Union And North Korea

The Soviet-North Korean relations in the 1970s were cold. For example, no mention was made of the Korean Peninsula either in Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Communist Party Congress (February, 1976) or in Gromyko's address at the United Nations' General Assembly (October, 1978). However, in late 1970s, a chain of notable events occurred ranging from the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (August, 1978) to normalization of relations between the United States and China (January, 1979), suspension of USFK withdrawal (July, 1979) and scrapping notification of the Sino-Soviet Peace and Cooperation Agreement (April, 1979). The creation of the so-called "anti-Soviet encirclement" in Northeast Asia naturally produced irritation on the part of the Soviet Union.

In his report to the 26th Communist Party Congress in February, 1981, Brezhnev at last supported North Korean position and revealed his intention to expand relations with North Korea. However, as was indicated by Kim, Il Sung's trip to China in September, 1982 and, then, his son Kim, Chung Il's trip to China in June 1983, North Korea put priority on its relationship with China.

Then, in February, 1982 when China accepted Brezhnev's proposal for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations in Taskant and the relationship began to improve, changes also emerged in the relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea. In the wake of Kim, Il Sung's visit to the Soviet Union in April, 1984, the relations began to expand dramatically in the fields of military as well as politics and economy.

The Soviets and North Koreans expressed their strong opposition to the strategic cooperation among Korea, the United States and Japan, denouncing it as the new NATO-style tripartite military alliance scheme in Northeast Asia. As described, they agreed on the security situations on Northeast Asia.

What is militarily significant is that since December, 1984, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft and

bombers have regularly flown over the airspace of North Korea. In return of this military favor to the Soviet Union, North Korea has been provided with latest weapons such as MIG-23s, SA-3 surface-to-air missiles, and SCUD-B surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, high-ranking officials of both sides have visited each other and there have been exchanges of Naval and Air Force delegations. Such close military ties further deepened to the extent that they held joint maneuvers of Navy and Air Force in the East Sea in October, 1986 and that similar exercises were staged in the same place this October. As seen above, they now hold annual combined drills.

(c) **The Influence of the Soviet Military Power in the Far East & the Security on the Korean Peninsula**

The Soviet military build-up in the Far East will stimulate Far Eastern countries, eventually leading to arms competition. China will press ahead with military modernization programs and so will Japan.

According to Cordesman, under the circumstances of large-scale military build-up progress in the Far Eastern and Pacific regions, there are limited dangers of armed clashes. He predicts, however, following potential conflicts:

- Soviet-Japanese armed clashes along the borders
- Limited proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pacific
- Armed clashes between South and North Korea and the responses of the Soviet Union, China and Japan to the crises
- Conflicts originating from Sino-Soviet changes and the responses of all Asian-basin countries to the crises
- Armed hostilities between the two Chinas
- New armed conflicts between China and Vietnam

What is noteworthy in his imaginary forecasts is the potential of inter-Korean conflicts and the Soviet-Chinese response to the conflicts. At this juncture, China reportedly seeks peace policies in the midst of its efforts to advance four national modernization programs. In its part, the Soviet Union supposedly does not want armed confrontations in Northeast Asia when it pursues the expansion of political and economic leverage in Asia and the Pacific and the development of Siberia. In spite of these speculations, the Soviet military build-up in the Far East increases the possibilities of military confrontations around the Korean Peninsula.

In particular, drastically-growing military bonds between the Soviet Union and North Korea these days serve to further enhance potentials of conflicts on this peninsula. This especially holds true when the traditional southward policies of the Soviet Union and military adventurism of North Korea whose ultimate goal is to communize the peninsula by force meet halfway. Even though the Soviets do not want armed conflicts in Northeast Asia, the heightened tension, triggered by the Soviet military build-up, will certainly stimulate North Korean temptations for armed provocations.

Furthermore, when political, economic and social problems inside North Korea surface, the possibilities of inter-Korean conflicts will grow.

5. Security Responses of Korea

(a) **Security Efforts**

Out of many definitions of scholars about "national security", two stand distinctive. One is "uni-

versality", which explains that the basic goal of national security is "survival desire" possessed by all sovereign states. The other is "generality" which defines that not only military strength but also all composite factors of national strength such as politics, economy, diplomacy and culture should be coordinated to act as means of ensuring national security. These definitions provide important meanings.

It is a well-known fact that the national security issue comes differently with different people and countries (Wolfers, 1962). That is because security and threat, just like they are stipulated in psychological state of human beings, are perceivers and because peoples of different countries have different standards and sensitivity about safety.

Especially, in case of Korea, it has more down-to-earth worries about its security than the United States, Japan and other allies not only from its geopolitical conditions and North Korean invasion in 1950 but also currently at the sight of the increasing Soviet military strength, and the forward deployment by North Korea of its troops plus its other military moves. It is generally agreed that as above, as far as security awareness is concerned, differences exist in degrees among allies. In terms of their security viewpoints and safety desires, this may be viewed as natural. However, when it comes to the security on the Korean Peninsula, Korean people need to overhaul and reconstruct, if necessary, their independent security awareness, for the Korean Peninsula has been their stomping ground and they have suffered bitter experience concerning their security on their territory.

In a case study of security policies, Morgenthau raised a threepoint theory as follows and his theory could be used as a frame of reference in the studies of Korean security policies:

- (1) One should build up one's own strength.
- (2) One should reinforce one's positions through one's deplomatic relations with other countries.
- (3) One should establish international system which guarantees peace and safety.

The above three points could further be analysed as follows:

- (1) One should intensify one's efforts for self-reliance in other words, strengthen one's self-defense capabilities.
- (2) Through collective security system, one should bolster one's stand and, at the same time, make more allies and less hostile countries.
- (3) One should mount efforts to establish systems which are capable of eliminating the occurrence of threat itself.

On the basis of three above mentioned platforms for our security policies, we need to consider more specifically issues of importance in the execution of our security policies. In other words, for the security of Korea, we should incessantly study (1) the subjects of threat "from what", (2) the values and interests we should keep "what", (3) implementation measures of security policies "how", and time factors "at this juncture"

The reason for unimpeded studies of the above mentioned points is that they are always susceptible to changes. As for (1) "from what", we should no more confine the subject of threat to the traditional ideas of the past, which ran, "We block invasion threats from outside, exclude invasions once they break out and, thus, protect our nation from the invasions." Today, the subjects of threat stretch beyond such basic threats as military provocations from outside to include non-military ones-political, economic and psychological-which could arise from inside. As the subjects of threats expand in their qualities, so have the related concepts of "from where" to bring about spacial

expansion concerning the range of the subjects. This actually requires the inclusion of Soviet forces in the Far East as a method of wielding influence.

(2) The values and interests that we should keep are also expanding. The most important of all in this issue is the matter of survival as a sovereign state (Brennan, 1961). Next come such issues as independence, dignity, people's rights and freedom, family traditions, democratic ideology...

(3) As far as security and military methods of "how" are concerned, the methods should be diversified, for the subjects of threat and the values and interests that we should keep are diversified and expand. Against that backdrop, all areas constituting national strength such as political and economic power in addition to military power should be effectively orchestrated. It is also necessary that there be a recognition as to the limits of each method and, as a result, excessive dependence on one single method should be avoided.

(b) Resolution of Conflicts

The spheres of potential conflicts between South and North Korea are vast. On a large-scale basis, the issues of reunification and political system exist and, on a small-scale basis, there are the Olympic question and the separate family matter. In general, "conflicts" and "cooperation" are viewed contradictory and it is also generally agreed that the higher "the degree of conflicts" is, the lower "the degree of cooperation" comes (Frankel, 1973).

In spite of some refractions, the inter-Korean relations so far have been checkered with confrontations, based on incompatibility. Particularly, a series of ferocious atrocities by North Korea against the South (for example, the atrocities committed by armed North Korean infiltrators in Uljin and Samchuk, attempted raids of North Korean commandos on the Blue House, the Rangoon bombing attack, kidnapping, hijacking or sinking of fishing vessels) have plunged the degree of the inter-Korean cooperation while raising the percentage of conflicts.

Professor Scott presented the degree of conflict activities and the evaluation of conflict seriousness as follows (Scott, 1973).

- (1) Unfriendly speeches by foreign ministers
- (2) Official documents of protest
- (3) Efforts to alienate opponents diplomatically
- (4) Military alliance aimed at opponents
- (5) Incitement aimed at provoking demonstrations in opponent's country
- (6) Execution of rebel warfares
- (7) Execution of limited warfares
- (8) Across-the-board nuclear response

For example, in case the presentation of a protest document is conducted as a means of conflict activity, only 15% occupies the degree of conflict while the rest 85% represents the degree of cooperation. In this case, there is ample possibility of negotiations and resolution of the conflict. According to the above points, currently in inter-Korean situations, there is a 50% degree of conflict if North Korea attempts agitation aimed at student demonstrations in Korea. However, if they carry out guerrilla warfares, the percentage goes up to 65%, which diminishes resolution possibilities to 35%. Professor Scott points out that it is important to keep the degree of conflicts within 50% and leave open the door to the resolution of the conflicts as much as possible.

The inter-Korean conflicts, confrontations or approaches could be characterized by Galtung's

Conflict Triangle (Galtung, 1969). When a conflict occurs, a negative attitude(A) arises between concerned parties. Sometimes, this attitude gives birth to destructive activities(B), which can serve as a cause for larger scale conflicts(C). According to psychologists, attack attributes of human beings lie in frustration. So to speak, frustration produces attack attitude, which eventually leads to another attack attitude, and this process encircles conflicts.

I am confident that in inter-Korean relations, it is essential to prevent the possibilities of conflict spirals. Then, what could be the resolutions of conflicts between South and North Korea? There can be several approaches to the resolutions.

I am convinced that two items out of Hass's supposition (Hass, 1974) provide significant points for the resolution of conflicts between the two Koreas: "Frequent contacts among parties concerned make the resolution easier." and "Conflicts are easier to be settled when resolutions are sought between parties concerned."

One of the measures to settle the inter-Korean disputes, on the basis of his first supposition, is that the two Koreas should expand opportunities of communication, deepen bilateral understanding and build up mutual trust. Based on his second supposition, another measure is that North Korea should refrain from pursuing possession goals, zero sum theory that the more the sacrifices are for opponents, the more benefits we acquire. Rather, it should seek milieu goals which could bring forth mutual benefits.

6. Conclusion

Along with Soviet emphasis on Asia and the Pacific, the military build-up of the Soviet Forces in the Far East and the expansion of their presence in the area pose a serious threat to Asian countries.

In this part of the world, the Soviet Union is in hostile relations with the United States and China, and it is inferior to the United States in the fields of politics, diplomacy, economy and culture. In an effort to free itself from such shortcomings, the Soviets keep on increasing their military presence.

In case of Korea, geographical characteristics, which place it at a blocking point against the advance of the Soviets into Northeast Asia, make the nation feel their means at a close range. In particular, closer military ties between the Soviet Union and North Korea are viewed as serious because it is a match between the Soviets who have traditionally sought southward policies and North Koreans who have insisted on communizing the Korean peninsula by force. In that regard, it is highly possible that the match will provide a fresh motive for North Korea to launch an invasion again the South.

In addition, North Korean threat is heightened by the simple fact that it maintains mighty military strength both in quality and quantity and that it has made offensive, forward deployment of their forces along the DMZ. Their intention of war could be transformed into a breakout of war at a moment's notice, for the decision making in North Korea, unlike that of democratic countries, is made by the unilateral judgement of its highest authority. Meanwhile, the possibilities can not be ruled out that the Soviets will incite their North Korean surrogate into a proxywar on the Korean Peninsula in an attempt to isolate Japan and encompass China in emergency.

At this crucial juncture, it is important for Korea in its security policies to take into account Morgenthau's three point category: (1) Korea should strengthen its self-defense capabilities and, thus, bolster its deterrence. (2) Korea-US Joint Security System should be enhanced. (3) More positive attitude and efforts should be made to take root of peace throughout the whole Northeast region. Furthermore, Korea should recognize once again the importance of crisis management to check in advance intentional North Korean armed provocations, avoid hard-line possession goal theories of zero sum game against the North and expand inter-Korean communications on a persistent basis to eventually achieve milieu goals of mutual benefits.

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Summary

While the Korean economy has experienced a high growth rate over the last two decades, agricultural sector has developed at a comparatively slower pace than other sectors. In the course of urbanization and industrialization, the agricultural sector faces numerous obstacles, including the labor shortage due to the migration from the rural to the urban area. It is widely recognized that without balanced development between the agricultural sector and the rest of the sectors, harmonized social and economic development may face serious limitation. To create the rural area as a "pleasant living community" for farmers and non-farmers, emphasis should be placed on rural development to

improve rural people's welfare, while there should be introduction of convenient facilities into rural area. Special attention should also be payed to the continious supply of major food crops on a national security basis and to the reasonable supply of agricultural machinery to alleviate the labor shortage as well as to develop agricultural infrastructures.