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Journal of Policy Studies
Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University

J. Policy Stud. 2022; 37(1):15-25

pISSN: 2799-9130, eISSN: 2800-0714

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52372/jps37102

Article

The (un)intended Effects of Regulatory Burden on Policy Effectiveness: The Case of Regulations Targeting NGOs

Julio C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez1,*https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8717-3454, Claudia N. Avellaneda2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7083-2863
1Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo School of Management, Department of Public Management, Brazil, Technical University of Munich, School of Social Sciences and Technology, Department of Governance, Germany, Bavarian School of Public Policy Richard-Wagner-Straße 1, Room B.257 Munich, Bavaria 80333 Germany Email: julio.zambrano@tum.de
2Indiana University Bloomington, O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs
*Corresponding author: Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo School of Management, Department of Public Management, Brazil, Technical University of Munich, School of Social Sciences and Technology, Department of Governance, Germany, Bavarian School of Public Policy Richard-Wagner-Straße 1, Room B.257 Munich, Bavaria 80333 Germany Email: julio.zambrano@tum.de

ⓒ Copyright 2022 Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University. This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Received: Dec 16, 2021; Accepted: Jan 28, 2022

Published Online: Mar 31, 2022

Abstract

Existing studies see foreign donors as (a) brokers between sustainable development goals (SDGs) and aid-recipient countries’ needs, or (b) intruders into aid-recipient countries’ internal affairs. The intruder view has triggered regulations of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) in aid-recipient countries. However, little is known, empirically, about how foreign donors respond to regulatory burden. We suggest regulatory burden adds uncertainty and turbulence to the operating context, negatively affecting government effectiveness in securing aid. This negative effect is moderated by the number of foreign donors operating in a jurisdiction. Propositions are tested in a data set derived from the 221 Ecuadorian municipalities during 2007-2018. Findings suggest regulations of NGOs have decreased municipalities’ ability to secure international cooperation. This negative effect is larger in municipalities with a higher presence of donor supply. These results encourage policy makers to consider counterproductive costs of overregulating foreign NGOs and other civil society organizations when designing regulatory tools.

Keywords: Regulatory Burden; context theory; international cooperation; municipalities; nongovernmental organizations