Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University
Article

Evaluating Performance-Based Contracting in Welfare-to-Work Programs: Selection and Earnings Gain Effects in Wisconsin Works*

Youseok Choi1
1Youseok Choi is an associate professor in the Department of Social Welfare at Hallym University in Korea. E-mail: yschoi@hallym.ac.kr.

© Copyright 2016 Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University. This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Received: Feb 09, 2016; Revised: Feb 25, 2016; Revised: Mar 25, 2016; Accepted: Apr 19, 2016

Published Online: Apr 30, 2016

Abstract

The Wisconsin Works (W-2) program, the TANF program in Wisconsin, has introduced performance contracting to align W-2 service providers’ objectives with the state’s goals by establishing financial and administrative incentives. Using individual-level administrative datasets from 1998 to 2005, this study examines whether the introduction and revision of the earnings gain rate standard improved the economic performance of W-2 participants. Results reveal that under exacerbating economic conditions and weakening financial incentives, the adoption of the earnings gain standard had a positive effect on maintaining the earing gain of W-2 participants. However, W-2 agencies responded to the changes in the earnings gain rate standard by controlling the movement of W-2 participants in and out of the program and selecting those who were more likely to be employed. This study discusses a better contract design to improve the effectiveness of the welfare service provision.

Keywords: performance-based contracting; Wisconsin Works (W-2); TANF; welfare-to-work program